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Arbitration Agreements that Expand Court
Review of an Award
MICHAEL H. LEROY & PETER FEUILLE*
Arbitration culminates in final and binding awards. Since the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) was passed in 1925, courts have put aside their hostility
to this alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process and followed the
congressional dictate to enforce contested awards. Using our database of 152
employment arbitration rulings that were reviewed in 278 federal and state
court decisions from 1977 to 2003, we find that courts vacate only 8% ofawards
when they use the narrow standards under the FAA. Our study includes,
however, a recent development-arbitration agreements that provide for
expanded judicial review of awards. Typically, these clauses require courts to
engage in a de novo review forfact-finding and legal errors. Although only nine
appeals courts have engaged in expanded reviews of employment and
commercial awards, five have vacated these bargained-for rulings. Only the
Tenth Circuit has rejected this approach, concluding that contractually
expanded standards are inappropriate because they "clearly threaten to
undermine the independence of the arbitration process and dilute the finality of
arbitration awards .... "1 We suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court resolve this
conflict among the circuits and reaffirm its consistent pronouncements to protect
arbitration from judicial interference.
I. INTRODUCTION
Indeed, short of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a
panel of three monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures they want to
govern the arbitration of their disputes. It is not clear, however, that parties have
any say in how a federal court will review an arbitration award when Congress
has ordained a specific, self-limiting procedure for how such a review is to occur.
* Michael H. LeRoy, Professor, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations and College
of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; and Peter Feuille, Director and
Professor, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.
I Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994).
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A. Statement of the Research Issue
Arbitration provides benefits that are unavailable in court. It is "an efficient
means of settling disputes, because it avoids the delays and expenses of
litigation." 2 This aim cannot be achieved, however, unless disputing parties agree
that the arbitrator's award is final and binding. But the rendering of an award is a
moment of truth. At that point, a party is permitted to challenge an award by
suing in federal or state court. The FAA 3 and equivalent state laws 4 authorize
courts to vacate arbitrator rulings but only on narrow grounds. Vacatur of awards
creates potential to undermine the goals of arbitration. 5
Our Article identifies a serious, emerging threat to arbitral finality.
Arbitration often results from an agreement by the parties to submit their dispute
to this forum. 6 But in some settings, including the employment relationship,
these agreements may embody one party's superior bargaining power. 7 While
courts do not view inequality of bargaining power as an impediment to enforcing
arbitration agreements, 8 they are vigilant for agreements that coerce individuals
to forgo access to courts.9 The tension between private and public dispute
2 KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co. v. Beauregard, 739 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
3 See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
4 See infra note 267.
5 See Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d
9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997) (observing that "[a]rbitration awards are subject to very limited review
in order to avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling disputes
efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation").
6 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Rd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
(1989). Volt understood that "[a]rbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion,
and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit." Id. at
479.
7 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 768
(2000) ("Given the lack of choice and the potential disadvantages that even a fair arbitration
system can harbor for employees, we must be particularly attuned to claims that employers
with superior bargaining power have imposed one-sided, substantively unconscionable terms
as part of an arbitration agreement.").
8 The U.S. Supreme Court has played an active role in drawing the line between
enforceable agreements that reflect the inherent inequality in bargaining power between
parties, and those that take unfair advantage of the weaker party. Thus, in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991), the Court said that "[m]ere
inequality in bargaining power ... is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context."
9 The U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned that "courts should remain attuned to well-
supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any
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resolution forums is evident in our analysis of employment arbitration awards
that undergo judicial review. Most of the 152 arbitration disputes in our database
involve employers who compel individuals to waive their right to sue and submit
legal claims to arbitration. We identify a new type of clause in these agreements,
one that expands the grounds for court review of an arbitrator's award. They
require courts to review awards for fact-finding and legal errors. Our empirical
research shows that these clauses result in a much higher rate of award vacatur.
This trend is alarming because it significantly undermines arbitral finality.
This, in turn, portends a significant shift in the relationship between private and
public forms of adjudication.' 0 One serious implication is that demand will
increase for scarce judicial resources.'I In addition, this pattern threatens to
counteract significant due process improvements in employment arbitration
systems that have recently occurred. 12 We show that expanded review clauses are
drafted by parties with superior bargaining power who are found by arbitrators to
have engaged in serious misconduct. The irony here is that these drafters
originally insisted that the weaker party in the dispute forgo access to courts. The
stronger party, having lost at arbitration, petitions a court to circumvent
prescribed deferential standards to review awards. This amounts to re-litigation
of the arbitration. We use the metaphor of a revolving door to symbolize this
manipulation of access to courts. A growing number of appellate courts give
effect to expanded review clauses. If this trend continues, the autonomy granted
to arbitration by the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress will erode. As a result,
contract."' Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985) (citation omitted).
10 On the one hand, arbitration is seen as a substitute for public adjudication. See
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31-32 . However, this simple equation is hard to square with the
informality and simplicity of many arbitrations. Commenting on this tension between public
and private dispute resolution forums, the Eighth Circuit noted:
Arbitration is not a perfect system of justice, nor it is [sic] designed to be. "[Wlhere
arbitration is contemplated the courts are not equipped to provide the same judicial
review given to structured judgments defined by procedural rules and legal principles.
Parties should be aware that they get what they bargain for and that arbitration is far
different from adjudication."
Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
I1 This logic is set forth in National Wrecking Co. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 1993):
Judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow because arbitration is intended to be the
final resolution of disputes. Arbitrators do not act as junior varsity trial courts where
subsequent appellate review is readily available to the losing party.
12 See infra notes 290 and 293.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the contractual promise for a final and binding award may succumb to "a sham
system unworthy even of the name of arbitration. '13
B. Organization of this Article
We explain the evolving relationship between courts and arbitration from
1746 to 1925 in Part ]l.14 In subpart I.A we document the early tensions
between these competing dispute resolution forums and show how courts
gradually came to accept arbitration as a legitimate alternative to trials. 15 By
1925, Congress wanted to ensure that courts would put aside their hostility to
arbitration, and therefore enacted the United States Arbitration Act (USAA).
This important development is explained in subpart U.B. 16
In recent years, courts have debated whether the USAA-later named the
FAA-was intended only for commercial arbitrations, or also arbitration of
workplace disputes. We analyze this controversy in subpart III.A.17 We also trace
the development of federal common law standards to review labor arbitration
awards under the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA). This discussion of
Trilogy standards, in subpart ll.B, 18 is relevant today because federal and state
courts borrow these principles from the union-management relationship to review
individual employment, as well as commercial, arbitrations.
Part IV focuses on arbitration agreements that expand court review of
awards. 19 Subpart IV.A 20 explores recent rulings upholding expanded forms of
judicial review in the Fifth,21 Ninth, 22 and Third23 Circuits. By recently rejecting
this approach, the Tenth Circuit24 protected arbitrations from broad re-litigation
in court. Subpart IV.B examines recent rulings from the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits that provide expanded review of employment arbitration awards. 25
13 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999).
14 See infra notes 35-70 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 50-70 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 100-211 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 102-53 and accompanying text.
21 See infra note 102.
22 See infra note 103.
23 See infra note 104.
24 See infra note 106.
25 See infra notes 154-211 and accompanying text.
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Subpart V.A reviews the academic literature on employment arbitration, 26
which is followed in subpart V.B with an explanation of how we created a
database of award-challenge court decisions. 27 Subpart V.C sets forth our
bargaining power theory to explain why parties draft agreements that expand
review of an award. 28
Part VI reports our research findings. Subpart VI.A 29 details sample
characteristics-for example, the success rate of individuals in arbitration and the
enforcement rate for challenged awards. Subpart VI.B 30 compares statistics for
awards that were reviewed using traditional FAA and Trilogy standards with
awards that were recently reviewed using expanded standards for fact-finding
and legal errors. In a key finding, we show that judicial enforcement of awards
declines when courts use expanded review standards.
We offer our conclusions in Part VII. 31 First, arbitration agreements that
expand court review of awards detract from recent due process improvements in
employment arbitrations. 32 Second, appellate courts create a revolving door of
justice that is biased in favor of parties with superior bargaining power when
they give effect to expanded review clauses. 33 We explain why the U.S. Supreme
Court should reject expanded review of employment arbitration awards.34
H1. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS: 1746-1925
A. Early Developments: State Common Law
Although arbitration is viewed as a recent innovation in dispute resolution, it
has been utilized in the United States almost from the nation's founding. Pre-
industrial courts developed common law rules in support of arbitration. 35 Their
26 See infra notes 212-23 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 224-45 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 246-61 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 262-68 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 272-96 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 281-86 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 287-96 and accompanying text.
35 Based on the materials we present in this section, we disagree with the prevailing
consensus that early American courts were hostile to arbitration. As we explain, their central
tendency was to support arbitration. We agree, however, that some American courts were
adversely affected by the English doctrine of judicial ouster, and as a consequence, pitted
themselves as rivals to arbitrations.
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deference to arbitration awards is reflected in principles that still have validity. 36
Arbitration was preferred for its procedural simplicity37 and efficiency. 38 Also,
because arbitration often resulted from pre-dispute agreements to avoid court in
case of a controversy, individuals were able to select for the arbitrator's ability
and judgment. 39 Early judges respected the finality of this process. 40 The
36 These principles include: 1) "[T]he award, if made in good faith, is conclusive upon
the parties.... Neither will it constitute any defence [sic] ... to show that after the award
had been published, [the arbitrator] dissented from it." Winship v. Jewett, 1 Barb. Ch. 173,
184-85 (N.Y. Ch. 1845). 2) "[An award may [be] good in part, and bad in part." Brown v.
Warnock, 35 Ky. (5 Dana) 492, 492 (1837); see also Banks v. Adams, 23 Me. 259, 261
(1843), stating: "An award may be good for part and bad for part; and the part, which is
good, will be sustained, if it be not so connected with the part, which is bad, that injustice
will thereby be done." 3) "After an award has been executed, the court will not set it aside,
upon the ground that the arbitrators were not sworn." Johnson v. Ketchum, 4 N.J. Eq. 364,
369-70 (N.J. Ch. 1843). But see Combs v. Little, 4 N.J. Eq. 310, 314 (N.J. Ch. 1843)
(providing that "as the arbitrators were not sworn, the whole proceeding is void"). 4) "The
technicalities and niceties once favored in relation to awards are no longer allowed."
Shockey's Adm'r v. Glasford, 36 Ky. (6 Dana) 9, 10 (1837). 5) "An award must decide the
whole matter submitted to the arbitrators; it must not extend to any matter not comprehended
in the submission; and it must be certain, final, and conclusive of the whole matter referred."
Carnochan v. Christie, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 446, 446 (1826). 6) "Awards being much
favored, the Court will intend every thing which the record will warrant, to sustain a
judgment rendered or an award." Tankersley v. Richardson, 2 Stew. 130, 130 (Ala. 1829). 7)
"Where an award upon its face purports to be final, and recites all the matters and things
submitted, it is prima facie final, and the party impeaching it must show proof to the
contrary." Campbell v. Western, 3 Paige Ch. 124, 138 n. 1 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
37 See Brush v. Fisher, 38 N.W. 446, 448 (Mich. 1888), expressing this rationale for
enforcing arbitration awards:
They are made by a tribunal of the parties' own selection, who are usually, at least,
expected to act on their own view of law and testimony more freely and less technically
than courts and regular juries. They are also generally expected to frame their decisions
on broad views of justice, which may sometimes deviate from the strict rules of law.
38 See Campbell, 3 Paige Ch. at 138:
If every party who arbitrates, in relation to a contested claim, to save trouble and
expense, is to be subjected to a chancery suit, and to several hundred dollars cost, if the
arbitrators happen to err upon a doubtful question as to the admissibility of a witness,
the sooner these domestic tribunals of the parties' own selection are abolished, the
better. Such a principle is wholly inconsistent with common sense, and cannot be the
law of a court of equity. There is, therefore, nothing in the proceedings before the
arbitrators which could justify any court in setting aside those proceedings for fraud, or
improper conduct, or any other irregularity.
39 E.g., Neely v. Buford, 65 Mo. 448,451 (1877) ("Courts are disposed to regard with
favor these tribunals of the parties' own selection ... ").
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Supreme Court of Michigan summarized this supportive philosophy: "'[T]here is
power in a court of equity to relieve against awards in some cases where there
has been fraud and misconduct in the arbitrators, or they have acted under some
manifest mistake .... But it is evident that there are great objections to any
general interference by courts with awards."' 41
However, some courts did not uphold awards. They retained jurisdiction of
disputes because private tribunals were not otherwise accountable to the rule of
law.42 Occasionally, the method of an arbitrator's appointment caused courts to
vacate awards. Even if such selection did not bias the arbitrator, courts perceived
conflicts of interest.43
40 Port Huron & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Callanan, 34 N.W. 678,679 (Mich. 1887) ("It is not
expected that after resorting to such private tribunals either party may repudiate their action
and fall back on the courts.").
41 Brush v. Fisher, 38 N.W. 446, 447-48 (Mich. 1888) (citation omitted). The court
elaborated:
It is a well-settled rule in equity... that an award of arbitrators of the parties' own
choosing, unless outrageously excessive on the face of it, and such as would induce
every honest man at first blush to cry out against it, cannot be set aside, unless there be
corruption, partiality, misconduct, or the use of an excess of power in the arbitrators, or
fraud upon the opposite party.
Id. at 450 (citation omitted). Knowing that the losing party at arbitration might be tempted to
back down from its original promise to abide by the arbitrator's award, the court observed
that "[t]he office of arbitrator is one voluntarily assumed, and is many times a thankless task,
and parties often feel aggrieved at their findings." Id.
42 E.g., Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868) (stating that "stipulations [for
arbitration] are regarded as against the policy of the common law, as having a tendency to
exclude the jurisdiction of the courts"); see also Prince Steam-Shipping Co. v. Lehman, 39
F. 704, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1889), remarking that arbitration "agreements have repeatedly been
held to be against public policy, and void." The best explanation for the policy is in Greason
v. Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491, 496 (1858) (citations omitted):
It is well settled that courts of equity will never entertain a suit to compel parties
specifically to perform an agreement to submit to arbitration. To do so, would bring
such courts in conflict with that policy of the common law which permits parties in all
cases to revoke a submission to arbitration already made. This policy is founded in the
obvious importance of securing fairness and impartiality in every judicial tribunal.
Arbitrators being selected, not by law, but by the parties themselves, there is danger of
some secret interest, prejudice or bias in favor of the party making the selection; and
hence the opposite party is allowed, to the latest moment, to make inquiries on the
subject.
43 See generally Herrick v. Estate of Belknap, 27 Vt. 673 (1854). The court determined
that a civil engineer employed by a railroad to administer excavation contracts, and who
thereby functioned as an arbitrator or umpire, improperly denied payment to a contractor
who was to be paid according to the amount of earth he removed. Denying effect to this
internal dispute resolution process, the court stated that the "injury has been caused by the
fraud or neglect of their officers .... It was for the interest of the company to have short
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Finally, early courts demonstrated some willingness to expand or narrow
their review of arbitrator awards in relation to the parties' contractual
arrangements. The boundary between autonomous and court-supervised
arbitrations was drawn by key jurisdictional phrases in pre-dispute agreements. 44
If a contract expressly provided for judgment on the award, courts functioned as
appellate tribunals. 45 But if an agreement submitted the matter to arbitration, this
discontinued the right to sue.46 In the same way, courts reasoned that
estimates; and under these circumstances no actual fraud need be proved." Id. at 676-77. In
Mansfield & Sandusky City Railroad Co. v. John P. Veeder & Co., 17 Ohio 385 (1848), the
contract provided for a professional engineer employed by a railroad company to exercise
impartial and independent judgment in determining whether an excavator's claim for
payment on a job should be made. Because the evidence showed that the engineer was
mistaken in denying a claim for payment, the court ruled that this contract worker was
entitled to equitable relief from Ohio courts.
44 This is demonstrated by the technical usage in Camp v. Root, 18 Johns. 22, 23 (N.Y.
1820) (emphasis added):
This is plainly a case of submission to arbitration; it is, in no respect, a reference under
the Statute. The parties chose to enter their submission upon the minutes of the court,
and to direct the arbitrator to make report to the court; but all this does not vary the
rights of the parties, nor authorize the court to give judgment immediately on the award.
The submission to arbitration was discontinuance of the suit.
See also Exparte Wright, 6 Cow. 399, 399 (N.Y. 1826): "A general submission of a cause to
arbitration is a discontinuance; but not where the parties agree that a judgment may be
entered on the report. And in such a case, if the submission be revoked, the court may
proceed with the cause to trial, notwithstanding the submission."
45 See Green v. Patchin, 13 Wend. 293, 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839):
[I]n all actions not referrible under the statute, if the parties refer the cause to referees,
by stipulation or rule, or both, and merely provide that the referees report, such
reference is an arbitration, and operates as a discontinuance. But if the stipulation of the
parties provide that a judgment shall be entered upon the report or award, and judgment
is entered accordingly, the parties are concluded by their own agreement.
46 See Rogers' Heirs v. Nail, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 29, 29 (1845), stating: "If parties to a
suit in court, by bond, submit the cause to the decision of arbitrators, without making any
provision in the submission to continue the jurisdiction of the court over the cause, such
reference will work a discontinuance ......
The doctrine appears to have originated in Larkin v. Robbins, 2 Wend. 505, 506 (N.Y.
1829):
The reason that the submission operates as a discontinuance, is not because the subject
of the suit is otherwise disposed of than by the decision of the court in which it was
prosecuted; but because the parties have selected another tribunal for the trial of it. The
court will not look to the proceedings of that tribunal to determine whether the suit is
gone beyond its jurisdiction. It is sufficient that the parties have selected their
arbitrators, and concluded their agreement to submit to them. It is this agreement which
withdraws the cause from the court, and effects the discontinuance of the suit.
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commencement of a lawsuit counteracted an otherwise binding submission to
arbitration. 47
These courts spurred a backlash. As arbitration gained acceptance in the
1800s, state legislatures directed courts to enforce awards. 48 Certain courts
resisted the rising tide of hostility to arbitration. As losers of arbitrations sued to
vacate awards, these judges expressed concern about parties who renege on their
promise to be bound by an award. To illustrate, a particularly deferential court
treated awards as final even upon evidence that the arbitrator was biased,
provided that the arbitrator's partiality was known to the parties during the
proceeding and the loser did not withdraw the submission.49
B. The Modern Era: FAA Standards for Judicial Review of Awards
The results of our empirical study cannot be understood without accounting
for the legislative history of the FAA. We compare the rate at which
contemporary courts enforce (also called confirm) awards while applying
traditional FAA standards with the enforcement rate under expanded standards
imposed by an arbitration agreement. Traditional standards are a mix of explicit
FAA criteria that embody the goal of Congress to insulate arbitrations from too
much interference by courts, and related common law principles that originated
in 19th Century court decisions that maintained the autonomy of arbitration.
The FAA's award enforcement standards were meant to neutralize court
doctrines that were hostile to arbitration. The paradigm of this antagonism was a
1746 decision, Kill v. Hollister, which ruled that an arbitration agreement could
not "oust this court."50 The English concept of "ouster" influenced American
47 E.g., Van Antwerp v. Stewart, 8 Johns. 125 (N.Y. 1811).
48 See Henderson v. Beaton, 52 Tex. 29 (1879) (upholding the constitutionality of a
Texas statute enacted in 1879 that provided for a board of referees or arbitrators to dispose
of civil actions by the consent of parties); Howard v. Sexton, 1 Denio 440 (N.Y. 1845)
(arbitration tribunal established under New York law is not defective even if arbitrators fail
to take oath as established by law); Conger v. Dean, 3 Iowa 463 (1856) (state statute did not
provide common law right to submit controversies to arbitration, but prescribed procedures
for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards); Colter v. Frese, 45 Ind. 96 (1873) (statute
provided for arbitration between contractors, workmen, furnishers of materials, and other
employees and creditors).
49 Fox v. Hazelton, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 275,278 (1830) (holding that because objecting
party "was content to proceed with the knowledge of the fact, relying upon the strength of
his cause, or the capacity and firmness of the other referees, he must be deemed to have
waived his exceptions").
50 Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746).
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courts. 5 1 Congress worried about a persistent rivalry between courts and private
tribunals, and therefore passed the FAA "to reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and
had been adopted by American courts. '5 2
The FAA originated in legislation titled the United States Arbitration Act
(USAA), which was first introduced in the 68th Congress in the House of
Representatives in 1923. 53 The purpose of the bill was "to make valid and
enforceable written provisions or arrangements for arbitration of disputes arising
out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce among the States or
Territories or with foreign nations."'54 Lawmakers vocalized their concern about
persisting judicial aversion to arbitration. 55 But in committee reports and debates,
they barely discussed standards for court review of awards. 56 The most revealing
51 Courts from the 1800s quoted Lord Kenyon's emphatic rejection of a motion to
enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement: "It having been decided again and again that an
agreement to refer all matters in difference to arbitration is not sufficient to oust the courts of
law or equity of theirjurisdiction." E.g., Thompson v. Charnock, 8 Term R., 134, 139 (N. Y.
ed. of 1834, 91) (emphasis added).
52 E.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n.5 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.,
222 F. 1006, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)); see also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S.
213, 219-20, 220 n.6 (1985) (explaining that when Congress passed the FAA it was
"motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire" to reverse long-standing judicial
resistance to arbitration). In its pronouncement on this point nearly forty years ago in Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), the Court recounted that "English courts
traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as 'ousting' the courts of
jurisdiction, and refused to enforce such agreements for this reason. This view was adopted
by American courts as part of the common law up to the time of the adoption of the
Arbitration Act." Id. at 510 n.4.
53 United States Arbitration Act, H.R. 646,68th Cong. (1923). On December 12, 1923,
an identical bill was introduced in the Senate. S. 1005, 68th Cong. (1923).
54 United States Arbitration Act, H.R. 646, 68th Cong. (1923).
55 See S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2-3 (1924); see also the comments of Sen. Thomas J.
Walsh during floor debate of the bill: "In short, the bill provides for the abolition of the rule
that agreements for arbitration will not be specifically enforced." 65 CoNG. REc. 984 (1924).
The same discussion appears from the House in 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924) (remarks of
Congressman Graham).
56 See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924), stating: "The award may then be entered as a
judgment, subject to attack by the other party for fraud and corruption and similar undue
influence, or for palpable error in form." The 1924 Senate report was only slightly more
informative. See S. REp. No. 68-536,68th Cong. (stating that an award could be set aside if it
was secured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; there was partiality or corruption on the
part of the arbitrators; an arbitrator has been guilty of misconduct or refused to hear
evidence; there was prejudicial misbehavior by the parties; or the arbitrator has exceeded his
or her powers.
[Vol. 19:3 20041
EXPANDED COURT REVIEW
explanation for the section on reviewing awards came from a brief that was
introduced during a Senate hearing. 57
The law that was finally passed in 1925 vested federal courts with
jurisdiction to enforce arbitration agreements. 58 Section 10 directed courts to
enforce these contracts, 59 while defining very narrow grounds to vacate
arbitration awards. 60 These criteria were limited to the following instances:
57 See Hearings on the Subject of Interstate Commercial Disputes Before the
Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 36 (1924):
The courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the arbitrators unless there is
in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common morality, it ought not to
be enforced. This exists only when corruption, partiality, fraud or misconduct are
present or when the arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers or were
influenced by other undue means-cases in which enforcement would obviously be
unjust. There is no authority and no opportunity for the court, in connection with the
award, to inject its own ideas of what the award should have been.
58 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2000)). The law applies to the following arbitration agreements:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 3 provides jurisdiction in "any suit or proceeding.., brought in any of
the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). It is important to note, however, that some
courts have declined jurisdiction to review an award, with the effect of leaving the award
intact. E.g., Garrett v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir.
1993) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32
(1983)):
The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court
jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the
duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-
question jurisdiction. . . . There must be diversity of citizenship or some other
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
59 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). After providing federal courts jurisdiction to hear controversies
over arbitration agreements, Section 3 of the FAA states that a court "shall on application of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000). Following the arbitration, Section 9
prescribes:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be
entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration.... then at any time within
one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so
specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 6 1 (2)
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them;62 (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; 63 or (4) where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
64
order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10
and 11 of this title.
9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000) (citations omitted).
60 Courts have colorful ways to express the narrow limits of this review. E.g., Eljer
Mfg. Corp. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1994) ("grudgingly narrow").
61 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2000). In interpreting this standard, courts have said:
For an alleged fraud.., to constitute grounds for vacatur, (i) the movant must establish
the existence of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, (ii) the fraud must not have
been discoverable upon the exercise of due diligence prior to or during the arbitration,
and (iii) the movant must demonstrate that the fraud materially related to an issue in the
arbitration.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lambros, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345 (M.D.
Fla. 1998) (citing Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir.
1988)), affd, 214 F.3d 1354 (1lth Cir. 2000).
62 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2000). Construing this term, courts have vacated an award only
when "either (1) an actual conflict exists, or (2) the arbitrator knows of, but fails to disclose,
information which would lead a reasonable person to believe that a potential conflict exists."
Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312
(1 th Cir. 1998). Other courts have added that "[i]n order to vacate on the ground of evident
partiality in a nondisclosure case, the party challenging the arbitration award must establish
that the undisclosed facts create a 'reasonable impression of partiality."' Lifecare Int'l, Inc.
v. CD Med., Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 433 (11 th Cir. 1995) (quoting Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11 th Cir. 1982)); Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th
Cir. 1994). Courts also reason that the "alleged partiality must be 'direct, definite and
capable of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain or speculative."' Consol. Coal Co. v.
Local 1643, United Mine Workers, 48 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Health Servs.
Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir. 1992)). They have rejected a more
intrusive standard, the appearance of bias or partiality. E.g., Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp., 975
F.2d at 1264; Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1984).
63 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2000).
64 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2000). Under this provision, challengers to an award contend
that "an arbitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed his powers because the
arbitrator disregarded Plaintiffs evidence." Courts have rejected these appeals, noting that
"[f]actual or legal errors by arbitrators-even clear or gross errors-'do not authorize courts
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These standards did not change when the USAA was codified and renamed
the FAA in 1947.65 In time, however, courts supplemented statutory grounds for
reviewing awards with common law principles. The most typical standard is that
the award was made in manifest disregard of the law, but courts have
emphasized its exceedingly narrow scope.66 Some courts have adamantly refused
to adopt this standard. 67 More activist courts have adopted other standards, all of
which have been construed against petitions for vacatur. The common variations
are that the award (1) is arbitrary and capricious, 68 (2) violates public policy, 69 or
(3) manifestly disregards evidence.70
to annul awards."' Gingiss Int'l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Widell v. Wolf, 43 F.3d 1150, 1151 (7th Cir. 1994)).
65 Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 670 (1947) (codifying the USAA as the
FAA).
66 E.g., Greenberg v. Bear, Steams & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 2000) ("review for
manifest disregard is 'severely limited"') (quoting DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.,
121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1997)). To find manifest disregard, a court must find that: "(1)
the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it
altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly
applicable to the case." Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 28 (citing DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 821).
67 See Mcllroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 820 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting
non-statutory grounds for vacating awards).
68 This stringent standard results in vacatur "only if 'a ground for the arbitrator's
decision cannot be inferred from the facts of the case."' Ainsworth v. Skumick, 960 F.2d
939, 941 (1 lth Cir. 1992) (quoting Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 903
F.2d 1410, 1413 (11th Cir. 1990)).
69 See Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 782 (11th Cir. 1993)
(stating that a court may deny enforcement to an award that "would violate 'some explicit
public policy' that is 'well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the
laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests"') (citations omitted).
70 For example, "[i]n very limited situations, a court may vacate an award because
arbitrators have manifestly disregarded the evidence. . . .A court may only vacate an
arbitrator's award for manifest disregard of the evidence if 'there is 'strong evidence'
contrary to the findings of the arbitrator and the arbitrator has not provided an explanation of
his decision."' McDaniel v. Bear Steams & Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 343, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citations omitted). However, a court is not allowed to "question the credibility findings of
the arbitrator." Id. In general, "judicial review of an arbitrator's factual determinations is
quite limited." Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Local 814, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 99 Civ. 9828,
2000 WL 1364367, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2000). In this vein, "a court may not review the
weight the arbitration panel accorded conflicting evidence." Sobol v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 208, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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III. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS FOR WORKPLACE DISPUTES
A. The Exclusion of Employment Agreements Under the FAA
The legislative history of the FAA was at the heart of a recent legal
controversy. When this law was passed, the U.S. economy was integrating into a
nationwide network spurred by trains and telephones. Interstate commerce was a
growing reality. In order to enable distant businesses to cope with this new scale,
the FAA federalized a small part of contract law, a field reserved primarily for
state regulation. Congress encouraged businesses to use arbitration agreements to
avoid lengthy and expensive litigation.71 Lawmakers worried that state courts
would not cede jurisdiction for private dispute resolution forums.72 They wanted
arbitration agreements enforced like other contracts. 73
The skeptics among them wondered aloud, however, about fairness issues-
for instance, arbitration agreements required by a party with superior bargaining
71 See 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924) ("It creates no new legislation, grants no new rights,
except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty
contracts.") (emphasis added). When the bill was introduced in the House, its sponsor, Rep.
Mills, explained that it "provides that where there are commercial contracts and there is
disagreement under the contract, the court can [en]force an arbitration agreement in the same
way as other portions of the contract." 65 CONG. REc. 11,080 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 68-96,
at 1-2 (1924); see also H.R. REP. No. 68-96 (1924) (Congress believed the procedural
simplicity of arbitration would "reduc[e] technicality [and] delay, and [keep] expense to a
minimum and at the same time safeguard[] the rights of the parties."); S. REP. No. 68-536, at
3 (1924) (The FAA, by avoiding "the delay and expense of litigation" would appeal "to big
business and little businesses ... corporate interests [and] ... individuals.").
72 The House Committee Report explained:
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law. Some centuries
ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they
refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were
thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that
the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted
with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly
fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although they have frequently
criticized the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results
from it. This bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced,
and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.
H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924).
73 The House Report states that Congress intended to place arbitration agreements
"upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs." H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1
(1924).
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power as a condition for doing business with it.74 Employment contracts raised
another fairness issue. Testimony from maritime and railroad union officers
suggested that workers would be forced to give up rights by agreeing to
unfriendly arbitration procedures. 75 Sensitive to this concern, Congress enacted a
section that excluded the employment contracts of "seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
76
This history became relevant in the 1990s. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.,77 the U.S. Supreme Court approved a mandatory arbitration
agreement that waived an individual's right to sue under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act and provided arbitration as a substitute for court. As a result,
many employers compelled their employees to sign similar arbitration
74 Even though there was no serious debate that businesses voluntarily entered into pre-
dispute arbitration agreements, Sen. Walsh noted that some businesses did not have real
power to negotiate contract terms:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into
are really not [voluntary] things at all. Take an insurance policy; there is a blank in it.
You can take that or you can leave it. The agent has no power at all to decide it. Either
you can make that contract or you can not make any contract.
Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong. 9 (1923).
7 5 INT'L SEAMEN'S UNION OF AM., PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SEAMEN'S UNION OF AMERICA 203-04 (1926). Labor union objections were
traced to the president of the International Seamen's Union of America, who addressed the
matter at the 1926 annual convention of his union:
[T]his bill provides for reintroduction of forced or involuntary labor, if the freeman
through his necessities shall be induced to sign. Will such contracts be signed? Esau
agreed, because he was hungry. It was the desire to live that caused slavery to begin and
continue. With the growing hunger in modem society, there will be but few that will be
able to resist. The personal hunger of the seaman, and the hunger of the wife and
children of the railroad man will surely tempt them to sign, and so with sundry other
workers in "Interstate and Foreign Commerce."
Id. (citation omitted). In response, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover suggested that
"'[i]f objection appears to the inclusion of workers' contracts in the law's scheme, it might
be well amended by stating 'but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce."' Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 before the
Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 14 (1924) (citation omitted).
76 Id.
It is the same with a good many contracts of employment. A man says, "These are our
terms. All right, take it or leave it" Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to
sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by the court, and has to
have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.
Id.
77 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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agreements.7 8 As some employees sued to gain access to courts, they contended
that the FAA exclusion of "'any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce"' applied to them.79 Occasionally, this argument thwarted
employer motions under the FAA for court orders to compel arbitration of
employment law claims.80 In 2001, the Supreme Court ended this interpretation
of the FAA when it ruled that the general expression "'any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"' could only mean occupations akin to
seamen and railroad employees. 81 This made most employment arbitration
agreements enforceable under the FAA, and at the same time, extinguished most
individuals' right to sue.
B. Arbitration in Unionized Workplaces: Federal Common Law
Standards to Review Awards Under the Steelworkers Trilogy
The FAA evolved in an unexpected direction by the late 1940s and 1950s, as
its coverage expanded to enforce a different kind of employment arbitration
award-those involving the voluntary submission of a dispute by labor unions
and employers. 82 Because Congress explicitly excluded only railroad and
maritime workers, some courts used the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements
involving other kinds of unionized workers. 83
Other courts took a very different path in enforcing union-management
arbitration clauses. In 1947, Congress passed the Labor-Management Relations
Act (LMRA) to curb a national strike wave. Section 301 created federal
jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements (CBA), and by
extension, the arbitration provisions in those CBAs. Lawmakers thought that this
section would promote industrial peace by moving labor disputes from picket
lines to arbitrations, and if necessary, to federal courts.
This created confusing overlap between the FAA and Section 301. Consider
an arbitration ruling on a matter of great significance to a particular union and
employer-for example, an employer decision to subcontract work performed by
78 See infra note 277.
79 Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1999).
80 Id.
81 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 105 (2001) (citation omitted).
82 See generally Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53
COLUM. L. REv. 157 (1953); Donald Wollett & Harry H. Wellington, Federalism and Breach
of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. REv. 445 (1955); Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H.
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957).
83 E.g., Local 205, United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233 F.2d
85 (1st Cir. 1956).
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the union. If the arbitrator ruled for the union and the employer refused to
comply, the former would need a court order to enforce the award. The employer
would seek to vacate this objectionable award. What criteria would a court use to
review this award? The FAA provided useable standards for judicial review of
arbitration awards, but apart from its exclusion section, that law had nothing to
do with union-management relations. Section 301 was enacted specifically to
deal with labor disputes, so a court would naturally use it to assert jurisdiction.
The problem with this form of jurisdiction, however, is that the LMRA said
nothing about the standards for reviewing awards. The only way to fill this void
was to create federal common law standards for this purpose.
The Supreme Court waded into this thicket in Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills84 by approving the development of federal common law contract
principles under Section 301. A short time later, the Court issued three closely
related decisions, now called the Steelworkers Trilogy, which set forth standards
for enforcing labor arbitration agreements. One Trilogy decision, United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., specified principles to guide
court review of a labor arbitration award. 85 Judges were directed to confirm
awards because unions and employers bargained for finality to their disputes. 86
But the Enterprise Court also set forth limited grounds to vacate an award: (1)
the award fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement;87 or
84 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448,456-57 (1957).
The Court ruled that federal jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements under
the NLRA, including arbitration provisions, arises under Section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947, and not the FAA. Id. at 450-51.
85 United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). After
the arbitrator's award reduced the termination of several employees to a ten day suspension,
the employer refused to comply with the award. Id. at 595. The Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit's order that denied enforcement to the arbitrator's award. Id. at 599.
86 Id. at 598-99. In a companion decision, the Court noted that the "function of the
court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract
interpretation to the arbitrator" because it is "the arbitrator's judgment... that was bargained
for." United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960). Another Trilogy
decision, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., observed that the arbitrator
"'is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the parties are
obliged to accept .... He is rather part of a system of self-government created by and
confined to the parties."' United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581 (1960) (citation omitted). The Court continued that "[t]he labor arbitrator is usually
chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop
and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not
expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment." Id. at 582.
87 Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597. The Court explained that the arbitrator's
award "is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
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(2) the arbitrator exceeds his authority. 88 In a companion Trilogy decision, the
Court presumed that the arbitrator has special insight into workplace disputes:
"The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the courts; the
considerations which help him fashion judgments may indeed be foreign to the
competence of courts." 89 The Enterprise Court also believed that the arbitrator
needs latitude and flexibility in adjudicating disputes:
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to
reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to
formulating remedies. There, the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide
variety of situations. 90
The strong message sent by the Trilogy to enforce awards was questioned
during the 1970s, as labor arbitration awards touched on subjects that were
regulated by public policies distinct from union-management relations.
Employment discrimination laws provided a notable complication for labor
arbitration.91 An employer in need of laying off part of its workforce might be
agreement." Id. When the arbitrator dispenses "his own brand of industrial justice" contrary
to the agreement, the "courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award." Id.88 Id. at 598. The Enterprise Court stated that an award should not be disturbed unless
the arbitrator "has abused the trust the parties confided in him and has not stayed within the
areas marked out for his consideration." Id. A court should not vacate an award merely
because it disagrees with the arbitrator's construction of the agreement. See id. It added that
a "mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that
the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the
award. Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award." Id.
89 Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581. The Court explained:
The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what
the contract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such
factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the
morale of the shop, [and] his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or
diminished.... The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and
competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be
similarly informed.
Id. at 582.
90 Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597. The Court added: "The draftsmen
may never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular
contingency." Id.
91 The classic statement of this problem appears in David E. Feller, The Coming End of
Arbitration's Golden Age, in ARBrrRATION-1976, at 97, 109 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald
G. Somers eds., 1976) ("Arbitration is not an independent force, but a dependent variable,
and to the extent that the collective [bargaining] agreement is diminished as a source of
employee rights, arbitration is equally diminished.").
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confronted by conflicting choices: Adhere to a CBA that requires layoffs in
reverse seniority order, thereby retaining white men, while laying off more
recently hired minorities and women; or comply with a consent decree resulting
from a race and sex discrimination lawsuit and ignore the layoff sequence in the
CBA.
The employer in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers faced this hard
choice and complied with a decree to avoid a discrimination lawsuit.92 But the
arbitrator, whose authority was grounded only in the CBA, ruled that the
employer violated the CBA by not following the agreement's prescribed order
for laying off workers. 93 After the employer refused to abide by the award, the
Supreme Court in W.R. Grace upheld the arbitrator's ruling. In doing so, the
Court stated an additional standard for reviewing awards: The award cannot
violate a public policy. But the W.R. Grace Court narrowed these grounds to
circumstances where "the contract as interpreted by [the arbitrator] violates some
explicit public policy." 94 Before a court vacates any award, it must determine
that a public policy is "well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by
reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of
supposed public interests."' 95
92 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum, & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983). The employer had entered into a consent
decree with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that required the company to
maintain its extant proportion of women and blacks in the work force in the event of layoffs
to remedy past sex and race discrimination at its Corinth, Mississippi plant. A year after
entering into the decree, the employer needed to lay off part of its work force and, consistent
with the decree, protected females and blacks by laying off white males. Having more
seniority than the protected employees, the white males filed a grievance to vindicate this
contractual right. After being compelled by federal courts to arbitrate this grievance, the
company lost at arbitration. Id. at 759-60, 763-64.
93 The arbitrator ruled that the employer had breached the collective bargaining
agreement, in opposition to the consent decree, and awarded the affected employees
damages rather than reinstatement. Id. at 764.
94 Id. at 766.
95 Id. (citation omitted). Some federal courts did not abide by this strong signal to defer
to arbitral rulings. Drug testing programs implemented in the 1980s were a flashpoint for
judicial intervention. When arbitrators reinstated drug-offenders, courts refused to enforce
these awards because these rulings were in tension with laws that penalized the underlying
offense. So, just four years after W.R. Grace, the Court revisited the public policy exception
to the general rule for enforcing awards in United Paperworkers International Union v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). An arbitrator reinstated a paper mill worker who was fired
after he was arrested in the company parking lot on a drug charge. Id. at 33-34. The district
court vacated the award, and thus, the company did not reinstate the grievant because it
believed that reinstatement would violate a public policy against operation of dangerous
machinery by drug-users. Id. at 34-35. Misco reversed these rulings. In doing so, it
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Before long, other public policies tempted courts to vacate arbitration
awards. Drug abuse was regulated by a wide array of criminal laws. Also,
occupational safety laws put employers under a duty to abate workplace hazards.
If an arbitrator reinstated an operator of an industrial slitting machine who was
fired for possessing drugs on an employer's property, the award would be at odds
with penal and safety codes. On the other hand, nothing in these laws would
specifically prohibit the employment of a worker who was arrested for drug
possession.
This was the problem presented in United Paperworkers International
Union v. Misco.96 The Court reinforced the message to avoid vacating awards on
public policy grounds. Its simple message was to leave the fact-finding function
entirely to the arbitrator, except in extremely rare instances where arbitrator fraud
or other serious misconduct is evident.97 Misco made an observation that is
especially relevant in the context of our research on agreements that expand
articulated an additional Trilogy principle for denying enforcement to an award-albeit a
narrow basis-when it said that an award may be set aside only if it "would violate 'some
explicit public policy' that is 'well-defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained "by
reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed
public interests."' Id. at 43 (citation omitted).
Misco did more than reaffirm the Trilogy. The decision dealt explicitly with two other
grounds that lower courts use to review awards. In effect, Misco enlarged upon the Trilogy's
broad ranging consideration of grounds for vacating arbitration awards. Thus, the Court
added these grounds for vacatur, but also stressed the main common law rule of confirming
awards, even when courts may disagree with these rulings or their reasoning. See id. at 38
(stating that "decisions procured by the parties through fraud or through the arbitrator's
dishonesty need not be enforced," but that awards that suffer from serious errors are to be
enforced ("as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and
acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error
does not suffice to overturn his decision")).
96 Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 29.
97 Misco stated a nearly absolute rule against reviewing an arbitrator's fact-findings:
When "only improvident, [or] even silly, factfinding is claimed ... [t]his is hardly a
sufficient basis for disregarding what the agent appointed by the parties detennined to be the
historical facts." Id. at 39. The Court elaborated:
Even in the very rare instances when an arbitrator's procedural aberrations rise to the
level of affirmative misconduct, as a rule the court must not foreclose further
proceedings by settling the merits according to its own judgment of the appropriate
result, since this step would improperly substitute a judicial determination for the
arbitrator's decision that the parties bargained for in the collective-bargaining
agreement. Instead, the court should simply vacate the award, thus leaving open the
possibility of further proceedings if they are permitted under the terms of the
agreement. The court also has the authority to remand for further proceedings when this
step seems appropriate.
Id. at 40 n. 10.
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judicial review of an award by requiring courts to examine awards for fact-
finding or legal errors: "Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal
error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower
courts." 98 After Misco some federal courts still did not get the message to leave
awards alone except in very rare instances. This prompted the Supreme Court on
two recent occasions to rebuke wayward judges. 99
To summarize, Congress and the Supreme Court have built separate but
parallel roads to arbitral autonomy in the modem era. These roads have taken
twists and turns for workplace arbitrations. One barrier was whether to interpret
the FAA's exclusion section so as to remove most employment arbitrations from
judicial enforcement. Ruling against this view, the Court's recent Circuit City
decision put almost all of these individual agreements on the FAA's highway of
enforceable arbitrations. CBAs presented another obstacle when the LMRA
provided federal jurisdiction to enforce them without instructing courts how to
review their by-product-arbitration awards. This resulted in the Supreme
Court's building of a highway in the Trilogy and its recent progeny that parallels
the road taken by the FAA. Both expressways to arbitral autonomy provide
narrow turnouts for runaway arbitrator wrecks, while leading all other awards to
the same destination-award finality.
IV. CONTRACTUAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Part IV we identify a recent split among appellate courts concerning
agreements that expand judicial review of an arbitration award. This
development echoes a theme from our discussion of the FAA in subpart lII.A.
Expanded review clauses first appeared in commercial arbitration agreements. 100
They also reflect a significant power imbalance in which the party seeking
expanded review of an award had superior bargaining power. 101 We examine
these commercial developments in subpart IV.A. Subpart IV.B analyzes
expanded review clauses that migrated a short time later to employment
arbitrations.
98 Id. at 38.
99 See E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 (2000); Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001).
100 See infra notes 102-04, 106.
101 See infra notes 109-12.
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A. Conflict Among Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
In recent decisions involving commercial arbitration disputes, the Fifth
(Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.), 102 Ninth
(LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.),10 3 and Third Circuits (Roadway
Package System, Inc. v. Kayser)104 held that awards can be reviewed under
expanded standards that parties set in their agreements. In addition, the Fourth
Circuit ruled in a non-precedential decision that parties may agree to expand
judicial review of an award. 10 5 The Tenth Circuit in Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline
Co. 106 is the only appeals court to reject this approach. In dictum, the Eighth 10 7
and Seventh 108 Circuits have taken a similar view, stating that they would apply
only FAA or Trilogy standards to review contested awards.
Several common threads run through these appellate decisions. The first
relates to the party who drafted the clause to expand court review. In every case,
this party had a clear economic advantage over the other party to the arbitration
agreement. In Gateway Technologies, MCI, a major telecommunications firm
that was outsourcing a project to a smaller vendor, drafted the arbitration
clause. 109 LaPine presented a similar economic relationship between a large
102 Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
103 LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e
fully agree with the Fifth Circuit [in Gateway Technologies]. Federal courts can expand their
review of an arbitration award beyond the FAA's grounds, when (but only to the extent that)
the parties have so agreed.").
104 Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001).
105 Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997).
106 Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
107 The Eighth Circuit expressed in dicta its concerns about allowing parties to expand
the standards for judicial review. UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992,
997 (8th Cir. 1998) ("It is not clear... that parties have any say in how a federal court will
review an arbitration award when Congress has ordained a specific, self-limiting procedure
for how such a review is to occur.").
108 See Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, 935 F.2d 1501,
1505 (7th Cir. 1991) ("If the parties want, they can contract for an appellate arbitration panel
to review the arbitrator's award. But they cannot contract for judicial review of that award;
federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract.").
109 MCI was the successful bidder to supply pay phone services for Virginia prison
inmates, and later subcontracted to Gateway Technologies the job of installing phones and
collect-call technology. Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Teleconmms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 995
(5th Cir. 1995). Later, the two companies became involved in a dispute, with MCI
complaining that Gateway's system failed to complete too many calls and Gateway
complaining that MCI circumvented Gateway's technology, depriving that company of
anticipated profits. Id.
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manufacturer, Kyocera, and a small start-up company.I10 Likewise, Roadway
pitted a shipping company with a nationwide distribution system against a small
operator that was under contract to deliver a minuscule part of Roadway's
packages,"' In Bowen, Amoco and its corporate predecessor drafted the
agreement, and the weaker party was a husband and wife who owned property
that was traversed by oil pipelines. 112 The second thread reflects a paradoxical
intention by the drafter to undermine the finality of the award for which it
bargained. The Bowen agreement provided for vacatur of an award "not
supported by the evidence.""13 The Gateway Technologies clause did not focus
on evidence, but instead expanded court review for "errors of law." 114 LaPine,
by comparison, expanded review on two fronts: "where the arbitrators' findings
of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or... where the arbitrators'
conclusions of law are erroneous." 115 The arbitration clause at issue in LaPine
facilitated expansive court review by requiring that an arbitrator decide the
matters submitted based upon the evidence presented, the terms of the parties'
contract, and California law. 116 The arbitration agreement in Roadway was more
complex and ambiguous than the others. The agreement created potential for
expanding the scope of judicial review beyond FAA standards in its choice-of-
state-law clause. 117 This provision was drafted without specifically defining a
private review standard. However, because some states administer arbitration
110 The underlying dispute involved a joint venture between LaPine, a start-up firm with
a design for computer disk drives, and Kyocera, a company that was licensed to manufacture
these products. LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1997).
Prudential-Bache was the middleman in this joint venture. This arrangement soured after
LaPine suffered business setbacks and Prudential ended its participation in the deal. Id.
Kyocera and LaPine restructured their business relationship in an amended agreement, but
when Kyocera refused to comply with it, LaPine sued for breach of contract. Id.
I"1 Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001). As an
independent contractor for Roadway Package System (RPS) who employed several drivers
himself, Kayser bought larger equipment at the request of RPS. The unequal nature of this
business relationship is also evident in RPS' evaluation of Kayser' s performance, which was
eventually rated as unsatisfactory. He was viewed as aggressive with warehouse people in
several locations. RPS gave him several verbal warnings before it terminated its shipping
agreement with him. This left Kayser with outstanding loans for equipment bought
specifically for this shipping agreement. Id. at 290.
112 Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 2001).
113 Id. at 930.
114 Gateway Techs., Inc., 64 F.3d at 996.
115 LaPine Tech. Corp., 130 F.3d at 887.
116 Id. at 886-87.
117 Roadway Package Sys. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287,289-90 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing
sections 9.3(e)-(f) and section 16 of the Linehaul Contractor Operating Agreement).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
laws with vacatur standards that depart from those enumerated in the FAA, the
parties' contract made it possible to opt out of FAA review of an award.
In a third common thread, the party with superior bargaining power lost at
arbitration, appealed this result to federal court, and invoked the expanded
review clause in the arbitration agreement. We now recount specific parts of two
awards that involved individuals and large corporations because the arbitrators in
these disputes appeared to exceed their authority. When seen in this light, the
companies had good reason to appeal their awards. However, the awards also
reflect the arbitrators' judgment that the stronger party not only breached an
agreement, but also acted unjustly.
In Bowen, after Amoco repeatedly denied that its pipeline was leaking (only
to be proved wrong at arbitration), the award ordered Amoco to deposit
$3,032,000 in an escrow fund to abate the contamination, and the award further
ordered payment to the Bowens of $100,000 for loss in property value; $1.2
million for annoyance, inconvenience, and aggravation; $1 million in punitive
damages; and $41,000 for the costs of investigation and mitigation. 118 The large
punitive award suggests that Amoco behaved unjustly, but the arbitration
agreement did not expressly provide authority for this remedy.
The Roadway award had a similar theme. It criticized a local manager for
failing to explain and correct performance deficiencies of Kayser, the
independent contractor. The award continued:
Based on many years of dealing with industrial relations jurisprudence in
American business, I find the RPS system lacking in due process toward
[Kayser].
Here the RPS system, which I respect, blinds itself into thinking-as long
as we document our side of the business arrangement, that is sufficient. For a
reputable business organization that performs an important service in the
economy, that is inadequate. 119
The arbitrator concluded that Roadway improperly terminated its contract
with Kayser and ordered the company to pay Kayser $174,431.15 in damages.120
The tone of the award conveys the arbitrator's sense that Roadway neglected an
important business ethic, but as in Bowen, the agreement did not authorize this
kind of judgment.
The details of the award in Gateway Technologies are not reported.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit noted that the arbitrator had found that MCI
breached its contract with Gateway Technologies and had awarded actual
118 Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930.
119 Roadway Package Sys., 257 F.3d at 290.
120 Id.
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damages, attorney fees, and $2 million in punitive damages. 121 The provisions of
attorneys' fees and punitive damages support our thesis that the superior party in
this dispute not only breached a contract, but took unfair advantage of its
economic power.
In all four commercial award challenges, the federal district court refused to
apply the expanded standard in the arbitration agreement. While the district court
opinion in Bowen is not published, the appeals court noted that the lower court
declined to apply an expanded standard and confirmed the award. 122 The district
court in LaPine also confirmed the award and refused to apply an expanded
standard, noting that "the role of the federal courts cannot be subverted to serve
private interests at the whim of the contracting parties." 123 The Gateway district
court confirmed the award, and in a somewhat convoluted decision, implied that
its ruling was based on traditional FAA standards. 124 The Roadway district court
used FAA standards, but differed from peer courts in Bowen, LaPine, and
Gateway by vacating the award. 125
In three of these award-challenge cases, the appeals court reviewed the
arbitrator ruling by using the expanded standard in the arbitration agreement. In
Gateway Technologies, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and vacated
the punitive damages portion of the award. The court considered itself bound to
the expanded standard of review in the agreement because "arbitration is a
creature of contract and the FAA's pro-arbitration policy does not operate
without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties."' 126 The Fifth Circuit,
noting that the district judge believed that "'the parties have sacrificed the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration on the altar of appellate
review,""' 127 took this contrary view: "Prudent or not, the contract expressly and
unambiguously provides for review of 'errors of law'; to interpret this phrase
short of de novo review would render the language meaningless and would
frustrate the mutual intent of the parties."'128 The court found legal error in the
121 Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1995).
122 Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 930 (10th Cir. 2001).
123 LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697,703 (N.D. Cal. 1995), affid
in part, rev'd in part, 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
124 See Gateway Techs., Inc., 64 F.3d at 996 (reporting that the lower court did not
interpret the arbitration agreement's standard of "errors of law" as requiring "'a scrutiny as
strict as would be applied by an appellate court reviewing the actions of a trial court' but
rather "'under the harmless error standard with due regard to the federal policy favoring
arbitration"') (citation omitted).
125 See Roadway Package Sys., 257 F.3d at 288.
126 Gateway Techs., Inc., 64 F.3d at 996.
127 Id. at 997 (citation omitted).
128 Id.
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award because Virginia law, under which the agreement was made, does not
allow for the imposition of punitive damages for breach of contract. 129
The appeals court in LaPine also reversed the district court, feeling
compelled to honor all of the terms of the parties' agreement. 130 The court
explained:
To locate the principle that animates our holding, one need not look very much
further than the Supreme Court's decisions applying and interpreting the FAA.
Those decisions make it clear that the primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure
enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate, in accordance with the
agreements' terms. 13 1
This led the court to conclude that "'[b]ecause these parties contractually
agreed to expand judicial review, their contractual provision supplements the
FAA's default standard of review and allows for de novo review of issues of law
embodied in the arbitration award.""' 132 The court specifically considered the
possibility that its conclusion undermined the purposes of arbitration to provide
speedy and inexpensive dispute resolution, and theorized that "if substantial
evidence and error of law review seems less efficient than the normal scope of
arbitration review, that should not cause much pause because: 'it nevertheless
reduces the burden on the Court below that.., would exist in the absence of any
provision for arbitration.' '' 133
The panel of LaPine judges did not unanimously adopt this reasoning. Judge
Kozinski concurred in the result, but doubted that parties could contract for any
129 See id. at 999-1001.
130 LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1997). Taking
this view into account on remand, the district court applied a substantial evidence standard to
the factual determinations made by the arbitrators, and engaged in a detailed review. LaPine
Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., No. C-87-20316, 2000 WL 765556, at * 1-*4 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
4, 2000). Next, the court reviewed the award for legal errors. LaPine, 2000 WL 765556, at
*4-*12. Finding no defects under either review, the court confirmed the award. Still
unwilling to accept a losing result, Kyocera appealed a second time to the Ninth Circuit, and
in a very lengthy decision requiring much closer review than in ordinary FAA vacatur cases,
the appeals court confirmed the award. Kyocera again appealed, for a rehearing en banc, and
effectively blocked confirmation of the award when a majority of the Ninth Circuit granted
its petition. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 314 F.3d 1003, 1004 (9th
Cir. 2002).
131 LaPine Tech. Corp., 130 F.3d at 888.
132 Id. at 889 (quoting Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993,
997 (5th Cir. 1995)).
133 Id. (citation omitted).
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and all types of judicial review. 134 His concern was that an unlimited principle of
expanded court review could bog down judges in time-consuming, or at least
unfamiliar, appellate functions. 135 In this instance, however, he decided to
enforce the arbitration agreement according to its terms because "[t]he review to
which the parties have agreed is no different from that performed by the district
courts in appeals from administrative agencies and bankruptcy courts, or on
habeas corpus."' 136 In Judge Mayer's dissent, he acknowledged that "[w]hether to
arbitrate, what to arbitrate, how to arbitrate, and when to arbitrate are matters that
parties may specify contractually."'137 But he concluded that there is "no
authority explicitly empowering litigants to dictate how an Article Ell court must
review an arbitration decision. Absent this, they may not."' 138
In Roadway, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's vacatur but
disagreed in its reasoning by stating "that parties may opt out of the FAA's off-
the-rack vacatur standards and fashion their own. ' 139 However, in a complex
ruling, the appeals court declined to construe the choice-of-law clause in the
arbitration agreement as clear evidence of intent to incorporate Pennsylvania's
standards for judicial review. 140 The court read the arbitration agreement as a
generic contract, one that failed to reflect a specific intention to apply a specific
vacatur standard.141
134 Id. at 891 ("In general, I do not believe parties may impose on the federal courts
burdens and functions that Congress has withheld.").
135 Id. Judge Kozinski stated:
[E]nforcing the arbitration agreement--even with enhanced judicial review-will
consume far fewer judicial resources than if the case were given plenary adjudication.
The rub is that the work the district court must perform under this arbitration clause is
not a subset of what it would be doing if the case were brought directly under diversity
or federal question jurisdiction. It's not just less work, it is different work. Nowhere has
Congress authorized courts to review arbitral awards under the standard the parties here
adopted.
Id.
136 Id. Judge Kozinski reinforced his point that courts cannot be asked to perform any
or all kinds of appellate review in this memorable passage: "I would call the case differently
if the agreement provided that the district judge would review the award by flipping a coin or
studying the entrails of a dead fowl." Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 294. The court stated, "[C]hoice-of-law clauses are generally intended to speak
to an issue wholly distinct from the one with which we are currently faced. Moreover,
because few (if any) federal statutes other than the FAA even pennit parties to opt out of the
standards contained in them, we are confident that this particular issue rarely occurs to
contracting parties ex ante." Id. (emphasis added).
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Only the district and appeals courts in the Tenth Circuit uniformly rejected
the expanded review approach. Amoco appealed to the district court to vacate its
adverse award, contending that the parties contracted for expanded judicial
review. 142 The company explained that the award was subject to vacatur if it was
"not supported by the evidence."143 The district court refused to apply an
expanded standard because it believed that parties cannot alter traditional
standards of review by contract. 144 The Tenth Circuit affirmed this ruling. 145
Stating its direct disagreement with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Bowen
court believed that there were inherent limits to the parties' contractual powers
under the FAA. Recognizing that the Supreme Court held that parties may agree
to their own rules for conducting arbitrations, the Bowen court added, "it has
never said parties are free to interfere with the judicial process."'146 Bowen said
that "Congress has provided explicit guidance regarding judicial standards of
review of arbitration awards" through the FAA. 147 The court added: "We would
reach an illogical result if we concluded that the FAA's policy of ensuring
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements is well served by allowing for
expansive judicial review after the matter is arbitrated." 148 That is because the
"FAA's limited review ensures judicial respect for the arbitration process and
prevents courts from enforcing parties' agreements to arbitrate only to refuse to
respect the results of the arbitration."' 149 Bowen made clear that "[clontractually
expanded standards" are inappropriate because they "clearly threaten to
undermine the independence of the arbitration process and dilute the finality of
arbitration awards."' 150
In sum, federal appeals courts are divided in their approach to giving effect
to expanded review clauses. This split of authority is rooted in the ambiguous
facts surrounding the Supreme Court's decision in Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University.15 1 Courts who
apply a contractual standard rely on the Supreme Court's holding in Volt that the
FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements, "like other contracts, in
142 Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 933 (10th Cir. 2001).
143 Id.
144Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 934.
147 Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 934 (10th Cir. 2001).
148 Id. at 935.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468
(1989).
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accordance with their terms." 152 But notably, Volt was premised on voluntary
forms of arbitration, stating that "[a]rbitration under the Act is a matter of
consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration
agreements as they see fit."'1 53
Our analysis in this section casts doubt on the Volt Court's assumption that
arbitration agreements reflect arm's length bargaining. Instead, expanded review
clauses seem designed to insulate the drafting party from an adverse outcome.
We note that, in theory, this chance to re-litigate the arbitration is equally
available to the weaker party. However, we did not observe this behavior in any
of these precedent setting cases. Instead, these decisions leave the impression
that the arbitration agreement reflected unfair dealing by the stronger party, as
well as an insincere intention to accept the finality of the process they invoked
earlier in these disputes.
B. Employment Arbitration Agreements That Expand Judicial Review
of Awards
In this section we show that expanded review standards are migrating from
commercial to employment relationships. As in our analysis of commercial
arbitration agreements, we focus on bargaining dynamics that led to the
expanded review clause in employment arbitration agreements. To set the stage
for this discussion, we recall the part of the Gilmer majority opinion which
ignored imbalances in bargaining power between employers who require
arbitration and individuals who have little choice but to accept this condition of
employment. 154 We are also mindful of the prevailing view by current academic
commentators that lumps together all employment arbitration agreements as
adhesion contracts. 155 Both types of categorical judgments about bargaining
power in the employment relationship are false. Because we cite specific abuses
of the employer power to compel employees to agree to arbitration, 156 as well as
countervailing evidence of new due process safeguards in employment
152 Id. at 478.
153 Id. at 479.
154 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) ("Mere inequality
in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements
are never enforceable in the employment context.").
155 Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition of Arbitration by Those with Superior
Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 857, 862-63 ("These agreements are typically
adhesion contracts and, unfortunately, we are at the point where, at least when the weaker
party has no power to negotiate the existence or the terms of the arbitration clause, the
weaker party needs some protection from the use of arbitration.").
156 See infra notes 246-51.
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arbitrations for otherwise powerless individuals, 157 we limit our judgment on this
bargaining dynamic to specific situations. As we now explain, some expanded
review clauses reflect specific instances in which employers take unfair
advantage of their bargaining power.
Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan158 was the first case of
expanded review of an employment arbitration award. Irma Collins alleged that
her employer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by firing her
for a psychiatric disability. 159 Work-related stress caused Collins to seek
psychiatric treatment. 160 An evaluation found that she had "homicidal ideation"
but was also fit to return to work. 161 After this information was shared with
Collins' employer, she was fired. 162 Collins arbitrated her ADA claim and
prevailed in the award. 163 The arbitrator found that Blue Cross violated state and
federal discrimination laws, and awarded back pay, attorney fees, and
reinstatement to a comparable position. 164
Collins sued in state court to confirm the award, but Blue Cross prevailed in
its motion for removal. 165 The district court ruled that it had jurisdiction because
the arbitration decided an issue of federal law. 166 The court reviewed the
arbitrator's analysis, and after finding no legal error or violation of public policy,
the court confirmed the award. 167 The Sixth Circuit reversed, however, on
jurisdictional grounds.' 68 As a result, the appeals court never engaged in the
expanded review that the arbitration agreement provided. However, the court's
jurisdictional ruling had the effect of denying enforcement to an award rendered
in favor of an employee. Thus, it functioned like an order that vacated the award.
157 See infra notes 290 and 293.
158 Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 103 F.3d 35 (6th Cir. 1996).
159 Id. at 36.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
1641Id.
165 Id. at 37.
166 Id.
167 Id.
16 8 The Agreement provided for judicial review of the arbitration award "as established
by law" and for the arbitrator's "clear error of law" in a "Michigan federal district court or
Michigan circuit court of competent jurisdiction." The Sixth Circuit explained that Blue
Cross's Notice of Removal characterized the matter as an employment dispute arising under
a federal law, the ADA. However, jurisdiction was determined by the actual complaint,
which in this case was filed by Collins pursuant only to Michigan's arbitration law. Since the
FAA does not independently confer federal jurisdiction, the appeals court ruled that the
district court improperly asserted jurisdiction and therefore vacated its order of enforcement.
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The Fourth Circuit was presented with an expanded review clause a year
later in Syncor International Corp. v. McLeland. 169 David McLeland signed an
employment agreement that restricted use of his employer's proprietary
information and also limited his right to compete against his employer, a
producer of nuclear pharmacies. McLeland also agreed to an arbitration
clause.170 After a complex chain of events in which McLeland incorporated a
similar business that solicited Syncor clients, his employer filed a demand for
arbitration to enforce its restrictive covenants.
McLeland did not attend the arbitration because he believed that this dispute
was not arbitrable. An ex parte arbitration was held, and the arbitrator ruled for
the Company by awarding it stock from McLeland's competing firm.171 Syncor
won a district court order that confirmed the award, but on appeal, McLeland
successfully argued that the district court erred by not applying an expanded
form of review of the arbitrator's ruling. 172
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the lower court should have reviewed the
arbitrator's legal conclusions de novo. The arbitration agreement specified that
the "arbitrator shall not have the power to commit errors of law or legal
reasoning, and the award may be vacated or corrected by judicial review for any
such error." 173 Thus, the district court incorrectly applied the principle that an
arbitrator's award is entitled to a special degree of deference on judicial review,
and may only be overturned where it is in manifest disregard of the law.
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit reached the same result as the lower court, albeit
after conducting a more searching review of the arbitrator's award. 174
More recently, the Fifth Circuit applied Gateway Technologies to the
employment setting in Hughes v. Cook.175 When Gracie Cook was hired as a
senior engineering assistant, she signed an agreement. 176 The contract modified
the usual standard for reviewing an award, stating:
Either party may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.., to
vacate an arbitration award. However, in [these] actions ... the standard of
169 Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997) (full text available
through Westlaw).
170 Id. at *3.
171 Id. at *6-*7.
172 Id. at *16.
173 Id. at *15.
174 Id. at *18. ("Our de novo review persuades us that the arbitrator did not commit
error, either legal or factual, in issuing his award. Accordingly, we conclude that although
the district court applied an incorrect standard of review, that error was harmless.").
175 254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001).
176 Id. at 590.
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review to be applied to the arbitrator's findings of fact and conclusions of law
will be the same as that applied by an appellate court reviewing a decision of a
trial court sitting without a jury. 177
Cook was assigned to work on computerized topographical maps in guided
missiles. 178 Cook's supervisor judged her work as deficient. 179 In response to a
lengthy test given to determine her fitness for continued employment, she and
her supervisor met with a human resource manager.180 During this meeting Cook
cried, stuttered, and rubbed her arm. 181 Her physician concluded that she
suffered a series of mini-strokes caused by stressful working conditions. 182 After
returning to work from medical leave, and being informed of the need to pass
another performance test, she experienced the same symptoms. 183 Cook quit her
job and sued in state court alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress,
race discrimination, and loss of consortium.184 Raytheon's motion to stay the
lawsuit pending the outcome of arbitration was granted. 185 The arbitrator
awarded Cook $200,000 in damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and her husband $25,000 for loss of consortium. 186
Raytheon sued to vacate the arbitration award, contending that the parties
agreed to expand the standard of court review. 187 The Cooks believed that this
standard conflicted with the promise to arbitrate disputes and was also
unconscionable in light of the parties' bargaining positions. 188 The district court
vacated the award, reasoning that the parties agreed to expanded court review of
the evidence at arbitration. 189 Since the judge did not believe that Raytheon's
performance test for Cook was extreme and outrageous, he ruled that the
arbitrator erred in finding the company liable for emotional distress and loss of
consortium. 190
177 Id.
178 Id. at 591.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.183 Id.
184 Hughes v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 2001).
185 id.
18 6 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
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On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Cook contended that her arbitration agreement
was not the product of arm's length bargaining. The court recognized that her
bargaining power was unequal, but noted that "contracts of adhesion are not
automatically void."'191 Concluding that it "was not unfair for the arbitration
agreement to include a standard of review that allowed the district court to assess
the arbitrator's legal and factual conclusions," the Fifth Circuit disallowed the
arbitrator's findings.19 2
The Fifth Circuit also applied an expanded standard in Harris v. Parker
College of Chiropractic, but in this case it confirmed an award. Bertha Harris
alleged that their supervisor created a hostile work environment, and their
employer did not take effective measures to end this form of race and sex
discrimination 193 After her discrimination lawsuit was removed to federal court,
she was compelled to arbitrate her dispute. 194 The arbitrator for her and awarded
damages for lost wages and benefits, mental anguish, and also punitive
damages. 195
Because her arbitration agreement provided that the "Award of the Arbitrator
shall be binding on the parties hereto, although each party shall retain his right to
appeal any questions of law,"196 the college argued that the court should apply an
expanded form of review. 197 After the district court confirmed the award, the
Fifth Circuit stated that courts are obligated to apply an expanded form of review
to conform to the parties' agreement. 198 Applying the contractual standard, the
191 Id. at 593.
192 Comparing the arbitrator's findings, as well as the arbitral record, with Texas case
law on emotional distress, the appeals court upheld the lower court decision to vacate the
award. Behaving as if it were the arbitrator, the Fifth Circuit decided the merits of the
dispute:
The district court concluded that returning Cook to the 'test bed' evaluation after her absence
from work did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. The court relied primarily on the
fact that Cook's physician did not expressly list any restrictions on her work duties. The court also
surmised that by instructing Cook to complete the 'test bed' evaluation within eight days of her
return, Raytheon simply resumed her normal work duties.
Id. at 594. The court continued its close focus on the record: 'This case does not involve...
repeated abusive behavior. Cook may have felt ostracized by [her supervisor], but [his]
conduct leading up to her return from medical leave was no more than a normal employment
dispute over an employee's work performance." Id. at 594-95.
193 Harris v. Parker College of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790 (5 1h Cir. 2002).
194 Id. at 792.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 793.
197 Id.
198 Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Fifth Circuit found that its task of reviewing the award for "'questions of law"'
was difficult because of ambiguity in this expression. 199 The phrase could
require the court to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
arbitrator's findings of hostile work environment and retaliation, 200 or mean that
the court should review only for pure legal conclusions. 201 The court concluded
that the standard of review to be applied is de novo with respect to pure
questions of law.202 As for questions of fact and mixed questions of law and fact,
the court stated it would apply a default standard, vacating only for manifest
disregard of the law or grounds listed in the FAA. 20 3 The appeals court affirmed
the district court's confirmation of the award. 2°4
Our database includes one additional expanded review case, 20 5 notable for
the fact that it was decided only at the district court level. After a CEO in
Bargenquast v. Nakano Foods, Inc.206 was fired, he arbitrated his dispute and
was awarded $418,775. In denying the employer's motion to vacate the award,
the district court refused to grant expanded review in accordance with the terms
of the contract. 20 7 The court reasoned that only Congress can regulate standards
199 Id.
200 Id. at 794.
201 Advocating this approach, Harris contended that if "questions of law" is construed
to include a review of the evidence, "then the exception allowing review of questions of law
will swallow up the arbitration agreement's rule that "'the Award of the Arbitrator shall be
binding."' Id. at 793.
202 Id. at 794.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 795.
205 We note here that a decision in our database approached the threshold for inclusion
in our count of expanded review cases. Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785 (8th Cir.
2003), involved a dispute an employee's exercise of stock options. The arbitrator ruled in his
favor and awarded him $1.6 million. The employer sued to vacate the award under an
expanded review standard or the common law benchmark of manifest disregard for the law.
The arbitration clause was ambiguous in its statement of a review standard when it provided:
"'The Arbitrator shall issue an award consisting of findings of fact and conclusions of
law .... The Arbitrator's decision shall be valid and binding.., so long as the Arbitrator
has not exceeded his or her authority."' Id. at 787 (citation omitted). The district and appeals
court confirmed the award using traditional standards. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that
because the parties did not expressly put an expanded review clause in the arbitration
agreement, the ambiguous language would be resolved in favor of traditional standards. In
view of the foregoing, we counted these two decisions as traditional review decisions.
206 Bargenquast v. Nakano Foods, 243 F.Supp.2d 772 (N.D. 111. 2002).
207 Id. at 774 (agreement specified that "[t]he arbitrator.., shall have no power, in
rendering the award, to alter or depart from any express provision of this Agreement or to
make a decision which is not supported by law and substantial evidence").
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of judicial review.208 Noting that the Seventh Circuit had not yet ruled on this
issue under the FAA, the Illinois district court cited a similar situation under the
LMRA in which this appeals court reviewed a labor arbitration award. 209 In that
case, Judge Posner noted that parties may "contract for an appellate arbitration
panel to review the arbitrator's award. But they cannot contract for judicial
review of that award. '210 The Bargenquast court also observed that the Seventh
Circuit had said in a previous decision that "the same standard of review applies
when a federal court is asked to set aside an arbitration award 'whether the award
is made under the Railway Labor Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, or the United States
[Federal] Arbitration Act.' '"211
To conclude, employment arbitration agreements that contain expanded
review clauses do not appear to reflect as much self-dealing by the party with
stronger bargaining power compared to commercial arbitrations in Section IV.A.
The employee in Bargenquast was a CEO who presumably negotiated terms of
his employment contract, including its arbitration provisions. In Syncor, the fact
that the employee had incorporated a business to compete directly with his
employer suggests, if anything, that the person with questionable scruples was
the party with ostensibly less bargaining power. Thus, in these two cases, there is
no reason to believe that the stronger party included an expanded review clause
as part of a pattern to accept only favorable outcomes at arbitration. On the other
hand, we doubt that Irma Collins, Gracie Cook, and Bertha Harris came up with
the idea to forgo court in favor of arbitration, and also wrote the expanded review
clause in their arbitration agreements. Collins and Cook worked for large
employers who, it appears, adopted mandatory arbitration programs to avoid
going to court over workplace disputes. Thus, we regard the expanded review
standards in these cases in the same light as those drafted by MCI, Kyocera, and
Roadway-as trapdoors to give these powerful parties a second chance to litigate
their arbitration case. This section shows that the emerging judicial policy for
business and employment arbitration permits a party to subvert award finality.
V. RESEARCH LITERATURE, METHODS, AND THEORY
A. Research Literature on Employment and Labor Arbitration
The Gilmer decision ignited a large body of critical legal scholarship. Much
of this research disparages the Supreme Court for steering legal claims of
208 Id. at 776.
209 Id. at 776 (citing Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.,
935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991)).
2101 d.211 Id. (citing Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1987)).
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individuals away from courts and into the more employer-friendly confines of
arbitration. 212 Notably, however, these concerns are not based on an empirical
examination of employment arbitrations. A few studies remedy this problem.
Lisa Bingham examined 203 employment arbitration cases arising under the
American Arbitration Association's Employment Dispute Resolution Rules. 213
She concluded that employers who were "repeat players" under this otherwise
neutral ADR system enjoyed an advantage over individual employees. 214
Richard Bales, on the other hand, studied just one model of mandatory
employment arbitration, but on an intensive basis. Reaching a very different
conclusion, he observed that a private employer's ADR methods can produce net
gains to the employer and also its employees. 215 Samuel Estreicher used an
212 Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2000); Margaret M. Harding, The
Redefinition ofArbitration by Those with Superior Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAH L. REV.
857; Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law,
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395 (1999); Julian J. Moore, Note, Arbitral Review (Or Lack
Thereof): Examining the Procedural Fairness ofArbitrating Statutory Claims, 100 COLuM.
L. REV. 1572 (2000); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion
under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea
or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of
Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
1017 (1996); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-
Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635; Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 1 (1996); Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the
Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77 (1996); Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-
But By How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589
(2001); George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ramifications and
Implications for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177
(1998). Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668, 671-72 (1986); Arthur Eliot Berkeley & E. Patrick McDermott, The
Second Golden Age of Employment Arbitration, 43 LAB. L.J. 774 (1992); Christine Godsil
Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer ?-Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of
Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 226-34 (1992); Samuel
Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 753
(1990); Wendy S. Tien, Note, Compulsory Arbitration of ADA Claims: Disabling the
Disabled, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1993).
213 See generally Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the
Use of Statistics on Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L.
REv. 223 (1998).
214 Id. at 258-59.
2 15 See RICHARD A. BALES, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW COMPULSORY ARBITRATION:
THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 169 (1997) (examining a progressive arbitration
system at Brown & Root, a nonunion construction company with 30,000 employees).
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empirical approach to conclude that individual claimants win more employment
dispute cases in arbitration than in litigation.216 Lewis Maltby found that
employees won in 63% of arbitrations but only 14.9% of trials.217
We use an empirical methodology to explore how courts rule on challenges
to employment arbitration awards. This is based on data that we extracted from a
comprehensive sample of court decisions. Information includes the gender of
claimants, type of legal claim asserted, winner in the award, amount of remedy,
and other characteristics of these disputes. This method follows studies of court
review of labor arbitration awards. Experts have long wondered whether courts
appropriately defer to labor arbitrator judgments.218 Soon after the Trilogy, the
National Academy of Arbitrators concluded that courts achieved a proper
balance in ordering enforcement of labor arbitration agreements 219 and
Compulsory employment arbitration offers tremendous benefits to both employers and employees.
It can reduce significantly the costs and time involved in resolving disputes. It also provides a
forum for adjudicating grievances to employees currently shut out of the litigation system. Finally,
it presents an opportunity for parties to resolve their differences in a way that promotes, rather
than discourages, maintaining the employment relationship.
Employment arbitration is not, however, a panacea for disputes arising in the nonunionized
workplace. The dangers of employer abuse require courts to be vigilant in ensuring that arbitration
agreements do not become a vehicle for eliminating employees' legal protections. Nonetheless,
given the litigation system's current inability to provide any meaningful forum to so many
employees who feel they have suffered legal wrongs in the workplace, compulsory arbitration,
properly implemented, can be a significant improvement over litigation.
216 Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 559, 563-
65 (2001).
217 Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 46-49 (1998).
218 See, e.g., Frances T. Freeman Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial
Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519 (1960); Russell A. Smith & Dallas L. Jones, The Impact of
the Emerging Federal Law of Grievance Arbitration on Judges, Arbitrators, and Parties, 52
VA. L. REV. 831 (1966).
219 In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Academy concluded that courts practiced
deference in accordance with the Trilogy. See Arbitration and Federal Rights Under
Bargaining Agreements in 1976, 30 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. ARB. 265, 288 (1978) (stating that
"[i]n general, if the arbitration award is not (in) manifest disregard of the contract and draws
its essence from the contract, it will be enforced by the courts in routine fashion"). The
Committee applauded courts for being "very sensitive about not usurping the role of the
arbitrator in reaching a final and binding decision of a contract dispute." Id. at 309.
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confirming arbitration awards. 220 But as more courts vacated labor arbitrator
rulings, commentators believed that courts were interfering too much.22 1
Bringing this research literature up to date, it is skeptical about judicial
adherence to the Trilogy.222 Empirical study of individual employment
arbitration awards has been very sketchy and almost non-existent because
widespread use of this ADR method is so recent.223
B. Empirical Research Methodology
For this study, we exhaustively investigated the outcome of court decisions
involving an appealed employment arbitration award. Our search identified both
employee224 and employer 225 appeals of adverse rulings. We used a variety of
220 More recently, Edgar A. Jones concluded that the "courts of appeal have . . .
interpret(ed) the 'essence' rationale in such a manner as to implement the determined effort
of the Supreme Court to surround labor arbitration and the parties' collective bargaining
agreement with the strongest possible measure of insulation from the displacing intrusions of
courts." Edgar A. Jones, A Meditation on Labor Arbitration and "His Own Brand of
Industrial Justice," 35 PRoc. NAT'L. ACAD. ARB. 1, 6 (1983).
221 One of the earliest expressions of concern about judicial review of labor arbitration
process is David E. Feller. See Feller, supra note 91, at 97. This theme was amplified in Eva
Robins, The Presidential Address: Threats to Arbitration, 34 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. ARB. 1
(1982). For more recent discussions, see Michael H. Gottesman, How the Courts and the
NLRB View Arbitrators' Awards, 38 PRoc. NAT'L. AcAD. ARB.168 (1986); Stephen R.
Reinhardt, Arbitration and the Courts: Is the Honeymoon Over?, 40 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD.
ARB. 25 (1988); Jan Vetter, Enforceability ofAwards: Public Policy Post-Misco, 41 PROC.
NAT'L. ACAD. ARB. 75 (1989); Michael H. Gottesman, Enforceability ofAwards: A Union
Viewpoint, 41 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. ARB. 88 (1989); William B. Gould IV, JudicialReview of
LaborArbitration Awards-Thirty Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT &
T and Misco, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 464 (1989).
222 See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 IND.
L.J. 83 (2001) (concluding that court review of awards under the public policy exception to
finality has invaded the largely self-contained domain of arbitral autonomy); David E. Feller,
Putting Gilmer Where it Belongs: The FAA's Labor Exemption, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 253, 282 (2000) (concluding that labor arbitration was once put on a higher plane than
arbitration of commercial disputes under the FAA, but now the situation is reversed). Cf.
Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow of Public Courts: The
Autonomy of Workplace Arbitration Systems, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 19 (2001)
(finding that court enforcement of labor arbitration awards has remained remarkably
consistent over a lengthy period).
223 LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 222, at 52-57 (reporting on results of 50 award
confirmation cases).
224 The most recent examples include Mack v. Strategic Materials, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d
934 (E.D. Mich. 2003), and In re Arb. between Atherton & Online Video Net. Inc., 274 F.
Supp. 2d 592 (S.D. N.Y. 2003).
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carefully chosen keyword searches on Westlaw's Internet service to generate
appropriate cases. 226 A case was selected only if (1) it involved a dispute over
some aspect of the employment relationship, 227 (2) in which a party petitioned a
court either to vacate or confirm a final award, and (3) the award was reviewed
either under the FAA, analogous state arbitration acts, or a contractual standard.
A decision was not included if it failed to meet any of these criteria. We now
elaborate on these selection criteria.
9 The underlying dispute involved an aspect of the employment relationship.
A typical dispute involved employer discharge of an individual. 228 However, our
search did not limit the kind of employment dispute. Others involved claims of
sexual harassment;229 race,230 age,231 or pregnancy discrimination; 232 personal
injuries233 and workers compensation;234 and family and medical leave. 235
Certain disputes were associated with particular occupations. Professional
employees, such as attorneys, 236 surgeons, 237 and dentists, 238 disagreed over
225 Current examples are Fountoulakis v. Stonhard, Inc., No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2434-
D2003, WL 21075931 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2003); and Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 754
N.Y.S.2d 264 (2003).
226 E.g., one search was based on key verbiage from FAA vacatur standards, as applied
to the employment setting: VACAT! & ARBITRAT! & "UNDUE MEANS" OR "EVIDENT
PARTIALITY" Or "ARBITRATOR MISCONDUCT' OR "IMPERFECTLY EXECUTED."
227 Issues included terminations (also called discharges or dismissals); lesser forms of
discipline; promotion and demotion; reassignment; benefits; pensions; working conditions (a
category that included sexual harassment); and pay (including bonuses, commissions, stock
options, and equity interests).
228 E.g., Madden v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 883 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994);
Matthewson v. Aloha Airlines Co., 919 P.2d 969 (Haw. 1996); Green v. Ameritech Corp.,
200 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2000); Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 67 F.3d 291
(3d Cir. 1995).
229 E.g., Smith v. PSI Services II, Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-6749, 2001 WL41122 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 12, 2001).
230 Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (1 lth Cir. 2000).
231 Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
232 E.g., McKenzie v. Seta Corp., 238 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2000).
233 E.g., Castleman v. AFC Enterprises, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 649 (N.D.Tex. 1997).
234 E.g., Glover v. IBP, 334 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2003).
235 E.g., Rollins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of North America, No. 99-56834, 2001 WL
537775 (9th Cir. May 18, 2001).
236 E.g., Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett & Morrisey, 672 A.2d 1132 (N.J. 1996).
237 E.g., Vascular and General Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Loiterman, 599 N.E.2d 1246
(Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
238 Grambow v. Associated Dental Services, 546 N.W.2d 578 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996)
(citing Grambow v. Associated Dental Services, No. 94-1735, 1996 WL 5638 (Wis. Ct. App.
Jan. 9, 1996).
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restrictive covenants in their employment contracts, or post-separation pay or
equity liquidation. Highly paid employees had compensation disputes. These
individuals were brokers for securities firms regulated under the auspices of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), 239 and CEOs or other senior
executives. 240 They quarreled over commissions, bonuses, stock awards, pre-
scheduled severance pay, as well as post-employment restrictions. 241
* The dispute was arbitrated to the point when a sole arbitrator or
arbitrational panel rendered an award-that is, to the point when the private
adjudicator reached a decision on the merits of a claim.
* The award was reviewed either under the FAA,242 analogous state
arbitration acts patterned after the FAA, 243 or contractual standards. 244 Selected
cases were checked against a table of decisions to prevent duplication of results.
The search was expanded by KeyCiting each decision. This allowed us to add
appropriate cases that our keyword searches overlooked. In sum, this
methodology was thorough and redundant. Nevertheless, we make no claim that
our sample is the universe of employment arbitration vacatur cases.
We used a lengthy survey to extract information from each court opinion,
such as, key facts of the dispute, reasons for the losing party's appeal, the court's
ruling, and the basis for this order.245 This information was coded into variables
(e.g., vacatur or confirmation of the award), and SPSS was used for statistical
analyses of the database.
C. Theory to Explain Contractual Expansion of Award Review
Court adjudication has a reputation for being expensive, time consuming,
and wasteful. Arbitration is praised for offering a simpler and less costly method
to conclusively resolve a dispute. With this in mind, we ask two questions: (1)
239 E.g., Hruban v. Steinman, No.01-2277, 2002 WL 1723889 (3d Cir. July 25, 2002).
240 E.g., Int'l Marine Holdings, Inc. v. Stauff, 691 A.2d 1117 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
241 E.g., Salvano v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 647 N.E. 2d 1298 (N.Y.
1995).
242 See supra notes 61-64.
243 See infra note 267.
244 E.g., supra note 198.
245 Our information was limited to the published facts and reasoning in each decision.
Thus, we had no access to the parties' contract, the arbitration award (except as summarized
by the court decision), any evidence adduced at arbitration, or the record produced in district
and/or circuit court. This prevents us from offering our own normative judgments of any
arbitration decisions or court rulings (i.e., we are unable to conclude how justified or
ill-advised these specific decisions and rulings were). This background is important because
it explains our inability to judge whether a particular court decision is consistent or
inconsistent with the Trilogy standards.
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Who would want to limit the finality of an award by exposing it to expanded
court review? (2) Why would a party to an arbitration agreement want to open
the door to court litigation after avoiding the expense and delay of these
proceedings in the first place? In brief, our theory is: (1) The party with more
bargaining power may want to limit the finality of an award by exposing it to
expanded court review. (2) The same party may have strategic incentives to re-
litigate an adverse award.
Expanded review of a final and binding award is a paradox by outward
appearances. Part of this mystery may be explained, however, by examining the
distribution of bargaining power between disputants. Expanded review clauses
reflect an imbalance in the parties' bargaining power. Even if arbitration is
nominally voluntary, in reality, one party may want it more than the other party.
Moreover, the first party exerts more control over all aspects of the arbitration
process. Controversies have recently arisen when individuals felt coerced to
arbitrate a dispute; 246 or where the employer set one-sided rules for the
arbitration, 24 7 selected the arbitrators,24 8 determined the allocation of forum
costs, 249 or drafted unconscionable terms in an arbitration agreement. 250 A few
employers have filled contracts with one-sided provisions only to see courts rule
246 See Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(company's lawyer used high pressure tactics to coerce the employees into signing the
Agreement by giving them no more than fifteen minutes to review a sixteen-page single-
spaced document, without mentioning or suggesting that the employees could review the
Agreement at home or with an attorney).
247 See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir.1999)
(employer's rules were "so egregiously unfair as to constitute a complete default of its
contractual obligation to draft arbitration rules and to do so in good faith," and finding that
the only possible purpose of these rules was "to undermine the neutrality of the
proceeding.").
248 See Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
The employer's roster of arbitrators embedded a conflict of interest that was hidden to
individual employees. The court concluded that "all three members of the arbitration panel
have an incentive to 'scratch' the back of EDS [the arbitration service] in the hope that EDS
will return the favor in the future ... " Id. at 947.
249 See Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 604-10 (3d Cir. 2002) (female
claiming sexual harassment asserted financial inability to pay for arbitration).
250 See Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("the
EDRP is unreasonably favorable to Bally because ... its terms allow Bally to unilaterally
modify the contract at any time, thus binding employees to a contract they may never have
seen .. ") (citation omitted); Geiger v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d
985, 997-99 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (holding that a one-sided arbitration agreement with high
school employees is unconscionable).
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that these "numerous elements of illegality permeate the overall agreement to
arbitrate." 251
When a stronger party inserts an expanded review clause in an arbitration
agreement a bias is created. To begin, courts have expressed concern about
employer-created contracts that do not clearly communicate important exceptions
to or limitation on employee rights.252 Just as in cases where employers make
inconspicuous but material changes in employee handbooks,25 3 the finality
provisions of arbitration may be explained to employees without also explaining
the significance of an expanded review clause. This possibility is suggested by
recent arbitration cases involving either form contracts or arbitration agreements
embedded in handbooks or policies.254 The point is that knowledge of the
expanded review clause may not be equally distributed or understood between
employers and individuals. That was the sense of the court in Cooper v. MRM
Investment Co., observing that "the agreement was still drafted by [the
employer], and imposed on a prospective employee precisely at the time that he
or she is most willing to sign anything just to get a job. Although
the... Arbitration Agreement binds both parties, only the [employer] is aware of
the ramifications of the agreement. '255
This inequality can be accentuated by delay and expense that attend the
arbitration. We found numerous instances of unusually lengthy arbitrations. 256
251 Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2003). Reflecting on
the employer's contention that continued work by employees constituted their acceptance of
the Company's newly instituted arbitration program, the court said that employees "were
presented with its terms without any real opportunity to negotiate. The thirty-day time
limitation, the restrictions on relief available to the plaintiffs, and, under the circumstances
of this case, the 'loser pays' provision for arbitrator's fees and expenses unreasonably favor
[the employer] to the [employee's] detriment." Id.
252 E.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985) (finding
that in the absence of a clear disclaimer to the contrary, an employee handbook created an
implied employment contract).
253 E.g., Durtsche v. American Colloid Co., 958 F.2d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir. 1992).
254 E.g., Kreimer v. Delta Faucet Co., No. IP99-1507-C-TG,2000 WL 962817, at *2
(S.D. Ind. June 2, 2000). The employee challenged the contractual validity of her arbitration
agreement because it was only a policy in a handbook. See also Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291
F.3d 1307 (11 th Cir. 2002) (stating that the employer issued a new handbook that required
all employees to arbitrate workplace disputes as a condition of continued employment).
255 Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771, 780 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
256 The worst of this lot was Barcume v. City of Flint, 132 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (involving ten years of litigation followed by an additional five years in
arbitration). Turning back the employer's challenge to an adverse award, the exasperated
judge commented:
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Other cases revealed high arbitration costs. 257 Assuming that more employers
than employees are able to endure and afford these problems, we theorize that
more individuals than employers will be exhausted by the time an award is
rendered. 258
The instant case is an unfortunate example of how profound delay imperils justice. The
Arbitration Award appears to be fair, especially given the number of Plaintiffs who will be
compensated, but the amount of time it has taken to arrive at that award is unfair. The parties have
endured almost seventeen years of litigation and arbitration. Any further delay in confirming the
award would be unjust.
Id. at 557-58. Other time-consuming arbitrations in our sample were Kanuth v. Prescott,
Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1991), where arbitration produced over
7,000 transcript pages and 1,200 exhibits; Sobol v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 49 F. Supp.
2d 208, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), where arbitration took sixty-two hearing days from 1994-
1998; LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 246 F.3d 702, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2001), with
nine postponements by the employer in seventy-four hearing dates and conferences from
1994-1999; Owen-Williams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 96-
14421996, WL 688219, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 1996), where arbitration took nineteen
hearing days; Kiernan v. Piper Jaffray Companies, Inc., 137 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 1998),
where arbitration took fourteen hearing days); Eisenberg v. Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P., No.
00-7220, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 26067, at *1 (2d. Cir. Oct. 17, 2000), where arbitration
took ten hearing days; and Mays v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1337
(M.D. Ala. 2000), where arbitration took nine hearing days.
257 E.g., Brook v. Peak Int'l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668,672 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002) (revealing that
parties spent over $650,000 in fees and costs related to the arbitration); Cassedy v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 751 So. 2d 143, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(prevailing employee was awarded $160,000 in attorneys fees); DiRussa v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 820-21 (2d Cir. 1997) (awarding employee $220,000 in
damages but denied $249,050.10 in attorneys fees); Campbell v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.,
Inc., No. 98-9582, 1999 WL 1424999, at *1 (2d. Cir. Dec. 23, 1999) (charging employee for
$45,000 in forum fees by the arbitration panel for fifteen hearing days).
258 See generally Morrsion v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003)
(discussing that the Sixth Circuit carefully considered the high cost of arbitrating
employment discrimination complaints). The court observed that a recent study using data
from three major arbitrations concluded that a plaintiff who arbitrates a common
employment discrimination claim will incur costs "that range from three to nearlyfifty times
the basic costs of litigating in a judicial... forum." Id. at 669 (citing PUBLIC CrrZEN, THE
COSTS OF ARBITRATION 40-42 (2002)). The Morrison court also noted that as "the monetary
stakes rise and more days of hearings are necessary, arbitration's relative cost increases." Id.
at 669. The court illustrated this problem by citing data from the study showing that for an
$80,000 claim, the costs of arbitrating ranged from $4,350 to $11,625. Id. at 669 (citing
PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra, at 42). In another study of arbitration cost cited by the Morrison
court, the American Arbitration Association estimated that the average arbitrator fee was
$700 per day and that an average employment case incurred a total of $3,750 to $14,000 in
arbitration expenses. Id. at 669 (citing Appellant's Brief at 13). The court used all of these
data to conclude that "the default cost-splitting rule in the Circuit City arbitration agreement
would deter a substantial percentage of potential litigants from bringing their claims in the
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Thus, even though on paper an employee is just as likely as an employer to
utilize an expanded review clause to contest an adverse award, we believe that
employers who draft this term are more likely to exploit it. While we provide
current case law examples to support our theory, we make clear the limits of our
charge against employers. First, as we demonstrate with statistics in Section
VI.A, only a very tiny fraction of employment arbitration agreements contain this
re-litigation feature. Thus, we caution against painting all employers with this
unflattering brush. Second, our database shows that employment arbitrations
have rapidly evolved from employer dominated systems to more independent
forms that yield surprising victories for employees. In particular, our sample
contained numerous cases where the arbitrator imposed punitive damages against
the employer. 259 This trend is ironic considering that the Supreme Court has
recently imposed numerical limits on the size of court ordered punitive
awards. 260
arbitral forum." Id. at 669. If the forgoing is true, this strengthens our claim here that more
employers than individual employees are able to withstand the additional cost of litigating an
award challenge do novo before a court.
259 E.g., Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(awarding the CEO $3 million for emotional distress, plus $1 million for punitive damages
as part of overall award of over $38 million); Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 754
N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (App. Div. 2003) (awarding securities broker $2 million in compensatory
damages and $25 million in punitive damages); Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc. v. Ulrich, 692
So.2d 915, 916 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (awarding $625,000 in compensatory damages
supplemented by punitive award of $1,125,000); Siegel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 79
Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (adding $1 million punitive award to actual and
compensatory damages totaling $338,016); Davis v. Reliance Elec. Ind. Co., 104 S.W.3d 57,
60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (awarding arbitrator $50,000 for emotional distress claim plus
compensatory damages, and in addition, $520,000 in punitive damages); Glennon v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 133 (6th Cir. 1996) (awarding employee $750,000 in
punitive damages); Turgeon v. City of New Bedford, No. CIV. A. 00-0694, 2000 WL
1804627 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000) (awarding arbitrator unspecified punitive damages
in addition to back pay, reinstatement, and damages for emotional distress); Barvati v.
Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994) (granting punitive award of
$120,000); Fahnstock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir. 1991) (awarding
$100,000 in punitive damages).
260 See generally State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513
(2003). The Supreme Court ruled that excessive punitive damages violate 14th Amendment
due process clause. The Court stated: "We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a
punitive damages award cannot exceed. Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now
established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process." Id. at 1524. This followed the Court's refusal in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 565,575 (1996), to sustain a $2 million punitive damages award which
accompanied a $4,000 compensatory damages award.
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These improvements in the fairness of arbitration help to explain the
motivation by a few employers to preserve the opportunity to re-litigate their
arbitrations. Due to court rulings that police gain too much manipulation of the
arbitration process, employers are ceding unilateral control over these ADR
processes. Ironically, they may feel deprived of a current trend in courts to apply
remedial limits on damages. 261 Meanwhile, as our cases show, arbitrators
continue to enjoy very broad remedial powers. Thus, employers may be losing
confidence in an ADR process that they initially envisioned as a method to
control damage awards.
VI. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
A. Sample Characteristics
Court Decisions: Our sample was comprised of 152 employment arbitration
awards that were appealed for vacatur or confirmation. Ninety-five of these
awards (62.5%) were reviewed by federal courts, and fifty-seven (37.5%) were
reviewed in state courts from 1977 through September 2003. In addition, 117
appellate courts reviewed first-level court rulings to confirm or vacate awards,
and nine supreme courts or higher appeals courts ruled on appellate decisions.
Altogether, there were 278 court decisions.
Who Won in Awards: Employers entirely won in seventy-seven awards
(50.7%). Employees partially prevailed in thirty awards (19.7%), and totally won
in forty-five awards (29.6%). In the fifty-four cases won by individuals where the
court reported details about the remedy, arbitrators were awarded as little as
$417.75,262 and as much as $38,233,079.263 The median award for employees
was $222,500. However, this statistic is potentially misleading because in some
cases arbitrators also denied an award of attorney fees to prevailing
261 See Parrish v. Sollecito, 280 F. Supp. 2d 145 (S.D. N.Y. 2003). A former employee
of a New York car dealership prevailed on her retaliation claim under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, and was awarded $500,000 in punitive damages by a jury. Id. at 150. On a
post-trial motion to reduce the punitive award, the court granted the employer's motion,
stating: "[A] punitive award significantly above the $50,000 cap... would reach broadly
across the divide between an appropriate award and an unconstitutional penalty." Id. at 162-
63; see also Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc., No. 97-2506, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
18680, at * 1 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1998) (explaining that the appeals court vacated jury award
of $400,000 to sexual harassment plaintiff who was also awarded $72,80 in compensatory
damages); Bell v. Helmsley, No. 111085/01, 2003 WL 1453108, at *1, *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 4, 2003) (reducing verdict award of $10 million in punitive damages to $500,000).
2 62 Unstad v. Lynx Golf, Inc., No. C7-96-2259, 1997 WL 193805, *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 22, 1997).
263 Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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complainants, leaving individuals owing more than the amount they received in
damages. 264 Arbitrators provided monetary awards in favor of employers in
thirteen cases. These ranged from $7,500265 to $1,164,000.266
Who Challenged Awards: Employees challenged awards in ninety-four
cases (61.8%). In the remaining fifty-eight cases (38.2%), employers challenged
awards.
Legal Grounds for Challenging Awards: We recorded at least fifteen
separate legal grounds to vacate awards or otherwise deny enforcement. In some
cases, categorizing these contentions was not automatic and required judgment.
For example, we treated awards that were vacated as irrational to be identical as
those deemed arbitrary and capricious. In other cases, we separately recorded
seemingly identical arguments. Prime examples were an award that violated a
public policy, and an award made in manifest disregard of the law. These
contentions seem to be synonymous; however, because they refer to different
common law standards with distinct legal tests,267 they were coded separately.
With this background in mind, we report the following frequencies for these
legal arguments. When a challenger raised several arguments, all were recorded
and tabulated. Thus, when the following figures are added they exceed 100%.
One set of arguments were based on the Trilogy standards. Awards were
challenged on grounds that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in eighteen cases
(11.8% of awards); the award failed to draw its essence from the agreement in
two cases (1.3%); the arbitrator committed a fact-finding error in one case
(0.7%); and the award violated or conflicted with a public policy in twenty-two
cases (14.5%).
264 DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 825 (2d Cir. 1997). The
arbitration panel awarded the ADEA complainant $220,000 in compensatory damages, but
denied his claim for attorney's fees, a common remedy for a prevailing party under the
ADEA. Id. at 820. As a result of the appeals court ruling that affirmed the award, DiRussa
owed $249,050.10 in attorney's fees for this arbitration. Id.
265 Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 67 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995).
266 See Everen Securities, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 312, 316 (111.
App. Ct. 1999).
267 See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1998) (observing that
in cases where a court reviews an award for manifest disregard of the law, "the reach of the
doctrine is 'severely limited'.... .[Mianifest disregard clearly means more than error or
misunderstanding with respect to the law."' Id.(citation omitted). The court stated that in
order to modify or vacate an award for manifest disregard, it "must find both that (1) the
arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether,
and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to
the case." Id.
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Alternatively, awards were appealed under FAA and related state
standards. 268 In eighteen (11.8%) cases, challengers claimed that the award was
procured by fraud, corruption, or undue means. Awards were also challenged on
grounds that the arbitrator was guilty of evident partiality or corruption in thirty-
two (21.1%) cases. In addition, arbitrator misconduct during the hearing was
alleged in twenty-five (16.5%) cases. The arbitrator was charged with exceeding
her powers or imperfectly executing an award in thirty-five cases (23.0%).
Other challenges were based on FAA common law standards. The most
frequent variant alleged that the award was made in manifest disregard of the law
(sixty-five cases, or 42.8%). Parties challenged awards as punitive (seven cases,
4.6%), excessive (four cases, 2.6%), unconstitutional (two cases, 1.3%), or
arbitrary and capricious (ten cases, 6.6%).
Two additional contentions in the common law category merit special
discussion. In two (1.3%) cases, a challenger claimed that a court lacked
jurisdiction to enforce an award. This was not a direct challenge to an award.
Thus, we could have excluded this argument from our tabulation. However,
because this contention was clearly meant to deny enforcement to the arbitrator's
ruling, we coded it as a type of award challenge. Awards were also challenged on
the basis of expanded review clauses in the parties' arbitration contract (e.g., the
award must be reviewed for legal or fact finding errors). Five awards (3.3%)
were contested on these grounds. Rulings were recorded for five district and four
appeals courts (3.2% of all decisions).
Who Won Award Challenges. In the 152 first-level court rulings on an award
challenge, employees won fifty-nine (38.8%) times. This means that their motion
to vacate a pro-employer award was granted, or their motion to confirm an award
that they won in part or in whole was confirmed. As the appellate process
continued, the employee win rate remained steady at forty-six of 118 second-
268 The states included in our database are: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 6-6-12 (1975));
California (CAL. CtV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982)); Colorado (COLO. REv. STAT. §13-
22-213 (1987)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-418 (1991)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 682.14 (West 2003)); Hawaii (HAW. REv. STAT. § 658A-20 (2001)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE §
7-911 (Michie 1998)); Illinois (705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11 (West 1999)); Louisiana
(LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4209 (West 1997)); Massachusetts (MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150,
§ 1 I(Law. Co-op. 1999)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5001(West 2000));
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §572.18 (West 2000)); Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.400
(West 1992)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-311 (1995)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:23A-26 (West 2000)); New York (N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 7511 (McKinney 1998));
Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.09 (Anderson 1999)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS §
10-3-12 (1956)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976)); and
Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. ANN. § 788.09 (West 2001)); as well as the District of Columbia
(D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4311 (2001)).
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level court rulings (39.0%), and two of nine higher appeals court decisions
(22.2%).
B. Comparing Awards Reviewed Under FAA/Common Law and
Contractual Standards
Table 1 (see Appendix) shows the frequency of court confirmation and
vacatur of arbitration awards. The first two rows arise out of court decisions that
reviewed employment awards. The first of these rows shows results from first-
level courts, while the second row combines findings from second- and third-
level appellate courts. The next two rows repeat this pattern, but with data from
commercial cases discussed in Section [V.A. Next, consider the columns of data
in Table 1. The left data-column shows confirmation and vacatur results for
courts that applied FAA or common law standards. The right column shows
results for courts that applied expanded review standards as specified in an
arbitration agreement.
Courts that use FAA and common law reviewing standards confirm a very
high percentage of awards. In employment arbitration challenges, first-level
courts fully confirmed 135 of 151 awards (89.4%).269 They partially confirmed
four awards (2.6%), and vacated twelve awards (7.9%).270 There were 118
appeals of these court decisions. Second-level appeals courts confirmed ninety-
six awards (81.4%), and partially confirmed six awards (5.1%). These courts
vacated or denied enforcement to sixteen awards (13.6%). Third-level appeals-
for example, to a state supreme court-were uncommon. In these nine cases,
courts confirmed only five awards (55.6%), partially confirmed one award
(11.1%), and vacated or denied enforcement to three awards (33.3%).271
Results for the much smaller number of commercial arbitration cases in
Table 1 are similar to employment cases. Cell C of that table shows that courts
confirmed three arbitrator rulings (75.0%) and vacated only one award (25.0%).
In Cell D, courts confirmed two arbitrator rulings (66.7%) and vacated one
award (33.3%).
Courts that apply contractually expanded forms of review confirm a lower
percentage of awards compared to courts that review under traditional standards.
First-level courts who applied expanded review standards behaved the same as in
FAA or common law decisions. Cell E in Table 1, showing employment awards
that were reviewed under contractually expanded standards, reports that courts
confirmed four awards (80.0%) and denied enforcement to one award (20.0%).
269 A ruling for one of the 152 award review decisions was too ambiguous to code.
270 Partial and full award confirmations are combined, and are reported in Cell A of
Table 1.
271 Data for both levels of appeals are combined and reported in Cell B of Table 1.
[Vol. 19:3 2004]
EXPANDED COURT REVIEW
This compares to the results in Cell C. These were also first-level reviewing
courts, except thatjudges here reviewed commercial awards. Like courts in Cell
E, they confirmed a very high percentage of awards. The point is that the results
in Cell C and E show that first-level courts follow the time-honored practice of
deferential review.
The results in Cells F and H depart from this pattern. Cell F shows that four
appeals courts reviewed lower court rulings that were based on contractual
standards of review, and confirmed only two (50.0%) of the four awards. In
similar fashion, appeals courts reviewing commercial awards under expanded
standards confirmed just two (40.0%) awards, and vacated three awards (60.0%).
Employers are not strongly committed to arbitral finality. The results for
Table 2 provide evidence to test our theory that employers strategically draft
expanded review clauses to avoid adverse rulings, and in doing so, exploit their
unequal advantage over individual employees in administering the arbitration
process. Who challenges awards? We found that fifty-eight (38.2%) of 152
award challenges were initiated by employers in the cases where courts used
FAA or common law standards to review awards. Individual employees initiated
most challenges (ninety-four cases, or 61.8%). However, the relative frequency
of employer appeals of final awards is surprising considering that these parties
steered the underlying disputes away from court and on to arbitration.
Employers disregard arbitral finality when the arbitration agreement provides
for expanded judicial review of awards. Employers were much more likely to
abandon their commitment to award finality in the cases where arbitration
agreements provided for expanded review. They challenged awards in 80% of
these cases. There was only one instance (20%) where an employee challenged
an award that was subject to expanded judicial review.
We found a similar result for the commercial arbitration cases that we
discussed in Section IV. When dealing with expanded contractual standards, Cell
D of Table 2 reflects our sense of the distribution of bargaining power in such
disputes. We inferred that the husband and wife in Bowen were the weaker party
to this arbitration agreement. They opposed enforcement of the agreement when
they filed a lawsuit against Amoco, a large oil company. Roadway Package
System was similar in the sense that a large transportation company imposed an
arbitration agreement on an individual contractor. Thus, we judged Kayser as the
weaker party. The individual employee who incorporated a small firm that
competed against his larger employer in Syncor followed a similar pattern. He,
too, was categorized in Cell D of Table 2 as the weaker party.
While it is not quite so easy to determine the identity of the party with less
bargaining power in LaPine and Gateway Technologies, we note that LaPine was
a start-up company who entered into an arbitration agreement with a large
manufacturing company, and Gateway appeared to be a small sub-contractor who
entered into an arbitration agreement as part of a business transaction with the
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large telecommunications company, MCI. We therefore classified these small
companies as the weaker party in these arbitration agreements. We also infer
from these facts that the large companies in Bowen, Roadway Package System,
LaPine and Gateway Technologies drafted the clause for expanded review of an
award. Cell D shows that these four companies initiated challenges to arbitration
awards under these clauses. We also believe that the larger corporate entity in
Syncor drafted the expanded review clause. Cell D reflects the fact that the
weaker party in that case, David McLeland, contested the award under this
provision. In sum, Cell D reflects the pattern we observed in the employment
arena: four out five award challenges were initiated by the drafter of the
expanded review clause.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Our research and analysis has led us to two conclusions:
1. While employment arbitration is improving to produce better outcomes for
individuals, some employers are drafting provisions in arbitration agreements,
including expanded review clauses, to maximize self-advantage. Expanded
review clauses undermine arbitration by creating broad grounds for judicial
review of awards that are supposed to be final and binding. Imagine that the fine
print in a pre-dispute arbitration agreement identifies a court to review the
arbitrator's award, declares the court's jurisdiction over any dispute under this
contract, 272 and expresses the parties' desire for a de novo review of the
arbitrator's ruling. So phrased, this clause would function like the revocation
doctrine from the early nineteenth century.273 By defining the court's jurisdiction
in these terms- not for the purpose of enforcing an award, but to conduct a de
novo review-this agreement would modernize the 1746 ouster doctrine which
the FAA meant to extinguish. 274
The contracts that are summarized in Table 3 (see Appendix) do more than
expand judicial review of arbitration awards. They eliminate final and binding
arbitration. These clauses are designed to litigate a dispute anew in court. In most
of the commercial and employment cases in our study, the party who appealed
for expanded judicial review had the original idea to substitute arbitration for
272 Cf Kill v.Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746).
273 Ex Parte Wright, 6 Cow. 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826) (quoting notes by Attorney
Robert Johnstone, "A general submission of a cause to arbitration is a discontinuance; but
not where the parties agree that a judgment may be entered on the report. And in such a case,
if the submission be revoked, the court may proceed with the cause to trial, notwithstanding
the submission").
274 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
910
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court proceedings, and also blocked the other party's initial attempt to litigate the
dispute in court. After this party lost at arbitration, it found new enthusiasm for
taking its dispute to court.
This is an unhealthy development for employment arbitration. It detracts
from model dispute resolution programs instituted by employers to achieve cost-
savings, privacy, and expedience for themselves and also their employees.
275
Expanded review clauses are similar to recent innovations in which certain
employers seek unfair advantages over individuals in the arbitral forum. These
include shifting large forum costs to employees, 276 designating inconvenient
venues, 277 placing arbitrary remedial limits on the arbitrator's powers,
278
shortening time bars for filing claims,279 and providing for the employer's
unilateral selection of the arbitrator. 280
275 See infra notes 290 and 293.
276 See Morrsion v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003).
Minimal research will reveal that the potential costs of arbitrating the dispute easily
reach thousands, if not tens of thousands, of dollars, far exceeding the costs that a
plaintiff would incur in court. Courts charge plaintiffs initial filing fees, but they do not
charge extra for in-person hearings, discovery requests, routine motions, or written
decisions, costs that are all common in the world of private arbitrators.
Id. at 669.
277 E.g., Poole v. L.S. Holding, Inc., No. 2001-57, 2001 WL 1223748, at *4 (D.V.I.
Aug. 20, 2001) (rejecting contention by Virgin Islands employee that Massachusetts is a
prohibitively expensive venue to arbitrate claim). Cf. Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co.,
No. CIV. 01-545(JRTFLN), 2002 WL 100391, at *9 (D.Minn. Jan. 23, 2002) (ruling
agreement to compel Minnesota employees to arbitrate claims in California to be
unenforceable).
278 E.g., Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 1998); Morrison v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 827 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that although
Title VII permits up to $300,000 in punitive damages, there is a $162,000 limit imposed by
arbitration agreement).
279 E.g., Louis v. Geneva Enterprise, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 912,914-15 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(holding that 60 day filing limit in an arbitration agreement unlawfully conflicts with three
year statute of limitations for FLSA claims); Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of America, 232
F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that because ERISA provides a four year statute of
limitations for an action to recover benefits under a written contract, the plan administrator
breached its fiduciary duty by adopting a mandatory arbitration clause that set a 60 day time
limit in which to demand arbitration).
280 See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding
that the employer's rules, which included unilateral selection of the arbitrator, were "so
egregiously unfair as to constitute a complete default of its contractual obligation to draft
arbitration rules and to do so in good faith," and finding that the "only possible purpose of
these rules was to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding"). Cf. Mei L. Bickner et al.,
Developments in Employment Arbitration, 52 Disp. RESOL. J. 8, 15, 80 (1997) (researching
employment arbitration systems by surveying eighty employers using pre-dispute arbitration
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This Article shows, through the use of statistical evidence, that expanded
review clauses open broad avenues for employers to escape the arbitrations that
they institute. Table 1 (Cell A) shows that 151 awards were appealed to a state or
federal court under traditional standards of review. Although employees initiated
a majority of these challenges, the remarkable point is that employer appeals
comprised nearly 40% of the sample. The surprise here is that a dispute
resolution system created and shaped by employers, without statutory
interference or bargaining with a union, would prompt so much abandonment by
its architects. The result in Cell C of Table 1 adds to this impression. When an
arbitration agreement provided for expanded judicial review, the employer rate
of challenging awards more than doubled.
Our results also shed light on a new fairness issue. Unless an employee is
someone special-a Chief Executive Officer,281 a lawyer who is also a
partner,282 or a successful securities broker who is able to negotiate specific
terms of employment283-the individual has no way to influence the procedures
and methods of an arbitration. Low-bargaining power individuals in our sample
worked in jobs that required little formal education or worldly sophistication. 284
Others had no legal counsel in their workplace dispute.285 For both types of
individuals, we doubt that they knew that the final and binding awards in their
agreement were subject to broad re-litigation in court. We also found a third
category of individuals: employees in better jobs, who had access to attorneys,
agreements, which showed empirically that about 15% provided for unilateral selection by
the employer).
281 See Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
282 Hackett v. Millbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, 654 N.E.2d 95, 97 (N.Y. 1995).
283 Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Schwartz, 969 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(allowing a securities broker with over six thousand clients to negotiate the size of his
Nebraska territory).
284 E.g., Autrey v. Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corp., No. 05-01-00292-CV, 2002 WL
102198, at * 1 (Tex. App. Jan. 28, 2002) (involving an employee who was a store clerk); May
v. First National Pawn Brokers, Ltd., 887 P.2d 185, 186 (Mont. 1994) (involving employees
who worked in a pawn shop); Mack v. Strategic Materials, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 934, 935
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (involving an employee who worked graveyard shift at a glass recylcing
center); Castleman v. AFC Enterprises, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 649, 651 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(involving an employee who was an assistant manager at a Kentucky Fried Chicken store);
Bunzl Distribution USA, Inc. v. Dewberry, No. 00-2325, 2001 WL 649482, at *1 (8th Cir.
June 11, 2001) (involving an employee who was a sales representative who sold plastic and
paper products to area supermarkets); Glover v. IBP, Inc., 334 F.3d 471,473 (5th Cir. 2003)
(involving an employee who split carcasses as a meatpacker).
285 E.g., Mendez v. Commercial Credit Corp., No. 98-2323, 1999 WL 617672 (10th
Cir. Aug. 16, 1999); Carmel v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. C1V. A. 99-MC-240, 2000 WL
1201891 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2000); Morado v. Service Employees Int'l Inc., No.
Civ.A.SAO1CA0512 FB, 2002 WL 31422374 at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 29, 2002).
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and who also encountered costly arbitration hearings and procedures. At the end
of these grueling proceedings, they probably lacked resources or fortitude to
carry the dispute on to court. These contextual factors explain why many more
employers than individuals sought expanded review of an adverse award. We
conclude that the opportunity to invoke an expanded review clause in an
employment arbitration agreement is not equally distributed between employers
and individuals. There is a bias in which losers in employment arbitrations will
likely appear at the door of the courthouse seeking review of an award.
2. The Supreme Court should preserve arbitral finality by rejecting expanded
review of employment arbitration awards. The Gilmer decision led to the closing
of courthouse doors to individuals who alleged statutory violations of their
employment rights. Although this ruling stirred controversy, 286 the Supreme
Court justified its approach because arbitration opened a new door to
disputants. 287 The recent trend expanding judicial review of arbitration is at odds
with this foundation principle in Gilmer because it supplants forum substitution
with forum propagation. This development also contradicts the Court's recent
and pointed pronouncements in Garvey that, "established law ordinarily
precludes a court from resolving the merits of the parties' dispute on the basis of
its own factual determinations, no matter how erroneous the arbitrator's
decision." 288
In the wake of Gilmer, many employers have adopted arbitration
programs. 289 In the past decade, the Gilmer majority's vision of employment
arbitration as a fair substitute forum has come closer to fulfillment. ADR
processes have been revised to include new safeguards for individuals. The
securities industry abolished mandatory employment arbitration in 1998.290 Also,
286 See Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1998) ("In the
aftermath of Gilmer . . . mandatory binding arbitration of employment discrimination
disputes as a condition of employment has caused increased controversy.").
287 Id. at 201 ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum.") (citing Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 437 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
288 Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 (2001).
289 See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 28
(2001) (reporting that more than five hundred employers and five million employees were
covered by its employment arbitration programs in 2000). This figure is more remarkable
considering that AAA is just one of several large providers of arbitration services. Id. at 11.
290 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on June 22, 1998 approved a
proposed rule change offered by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD)
that abolishes mandatory NASD arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims.
See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Arbitration of
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as some courts ruled that employment arbitration agreements were adhesive or
unconscionable, 291 arbitration agreements were revised so that employees could
opt-out of this private process.292 In addition, leading arbitration services adopted
comprehensive due process rules specifically for employment disputes to ensure
the fairness and neutrality of these specialized arbitrations.2 93
In light of these developments, the Supreme Court should protect its
investment in employment arbitration by overruling the expanded review
approach taken by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. Expanded review clauses install
a revolving door of justice in American courthouses. In Gilmer and Circuit City,
employers closed these courthouse doors to individuals who wanted to litigate
their workplace disputes. Those employers who seek expanded review of an
award now return to court for what amounts to a 'do-over' of their own private
Employment Discrimination Claims, 63 Fed. Reg. 35,299 (June 29, 1998) (rule became
effective on Jan. 1, 1999). In a separate action on December 29, 1998, the SEC amended
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (NYSE) Rules 347 and 600 "to exclude claims of
employment discrimination, including sexual harassment, in violation of a statute from
arbitration unless the parties have agreed to arbitrate the claim after it has arisen." See Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to
Arbitration Rules 64 Fed. Reg. 1051 (Jan. 7, 1999).
291 Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 694 (Cal.
2000). The California Supreme Court held that a mandatory employment arbitration
agreement was unconscionable, violated the State's public policy against employment
discrimination, and unlawfully limited recovery for statutory damages. In finding that the
arbitration procedure was an adhesion contract, the California Supreme Court contradicted
Gilmer's broad approval of this ADR method. Id.at 689.
292 See Luong v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. SA CV 00-763 AHS (EEx), 2001 WL
935317 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2001); Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1279,
1287 (N.D. Ala. 2000); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., No. 3:97CV538, 1998 WL
743937 (E.D. VA. Oct. 1, 1998).
293 Susan McGolrick, Arbitration: Revised AAA Arbitration Procedures Reflect Due
Process Task Force Scheme, DAILY LAB. REP., May 28, 1996, at A-1. The American
Arbitration Association (AAA) revised its procedures for mediation and arbitration of
employment disputes to ensure due process for employees. The new rules resulted from the
AAA's one-year pilot program in California, which implemented experimental rules
developed by a committee of management and plaintiffs' attorneys, arbitrators, and retired
judges. Also, the new rules incorporated due process suggestions from the American Bar
Association's Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment. As part of this
reform, AAA developed a roster of employment arbitrators who must undergo national
training program focusing on substantive and procedural issues. In addition, another leading
arbitration service, JAMS/Endispute, adopted similar fairness rules in January 1995. The due
process reforms included wide-ranging powers of discovery vested in arbitrators, the right to
representation, the same burdens of proof as in courts, and broad remedial powers for
arbitrators, including authority to order attorneys' fees. Moreover, "[airbitrators must be
experienced in employment law, have no conflicts of interest," and "disclose all relevant
information affecting neutrality, and be mutually acceptable to the parties." Id.
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process. When this revolving courthouse door returns the unsuspecting
individual to the forum she originally sought, she loses the substantial benefit of
trying her case before a sympathetic jury. Instead, this turnstile leads to an
anomalous appellate review of an informal record created at the arbitration.
Magnifying this problem, there is no requirement to transcribe arbitrations or
have written explanations of awards. Thus, review of an award cannot replicate
an appellate court's typical experience with a trial record. In addition, by the time
an individual goes through this revolving door, she is more likely than her
employer to be worn down by an arbitral forum that often fails to provide a
prompt, efficient, and low cost result. Failure by the Supreme Court to halt this
development will erode its vision that the FAA "declared a national policy
favoring arbitration." 294 The Court should act on its previous recognition that
"there is so much [current] agitation against the costliness and delays of
litigation. '295 If the Court does not act, arbitration will lose its efficiency and low
cost, ability to resolve disputes promptly, and promise to deliver final and
binding resolutions.
294 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
295 Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978,985 (2d Cir.
1942).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Table 1
Awards Reviewed under FAA/Common Law
and Expanded Review Standards (1977- September 2003)
FAA/Common Law Parties' Contractual
Standard Standard
Employment Award A E
Initial Court Review
Confirm 139 (92.1%) 4 (80.0%)
Vacate 12 (7.9%) 1 (20.0%)
Employment Award B F
Appeals Court Review
Confirm 102 (86.4%) 2 (50.0%)
Vacate 16 (13.6%) 2 (50.0%)
Commercial Award C G
Initial Court Review
Confirm 3 (75.0%) 0
Vacate 1 (25.0%) 0
Commercial Award D H
Appeals Court Review
Confirm 2 (66.7%) 2 (40.0%)
Vacate 1 (33.3%) 3 (60.0%)
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Table 2
Who Challenges Awards Under Expanded Review Clauses?
FAA/Common Law Expanded Contractual
Standard Standard
Employment A B
Arbitration Award
Employee 94 (61.8%) 1(20.0%)
Employer 58 (38.2%) 4 (80.0%)
Commercial C D
Arbitration Award
Weaker Party 0 1 (20.0%)
Drafter 0 4 (80.0%)
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Table 3
Arbitration Clauses That Expand Judicial Review of Awards
Decision Contract Language Modifying JudicialStandard of Review
The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) based
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. upon any of the grounds referred to in the Federal Arbitration
Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d Act, (ii) where the arbitrator's findings of fact are not supported
884, 890 (9th Cir. 1997). by substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrator's conclusions
of law are erroneous.
Syncor Int'l Corp. v.
McLeland, No. 96-2261, "[A]rbitrator shall not have the power to commit errors of law or
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS legal reasoning, and the award may be vacated or corrected by
21248, *15 (4th Cir. Aug. judicial review for any such error."
11, 1997).
Collins v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Michigan, 103 Judicial review of the arbitration award "as established by law"
F.3d 35, 36 (6th Cir. and for the arbitrator's "clear error of law."
1996).
"[T]he Award of the Arbitrator shall be binding on the parties
Harris v. Parker College of hereto, although each party shall retain his right to appeal anyChiropractic, 286 F.3d questions of law, and judgment may be entered thereon in any
790, 793 (5th Cir. 2002). court having jurisdiction."
"Either party may bring an action in any court of competent
Hughes Training Inc. v. jurisdiction.., to vacate an arbitration award.... [The standard
Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 590 of review to be applied to the arbitrator's findings of fact and5Cook. 2 . conclusions of law will be the same as that applied by an(5th Cir. 2001). appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial court sitting
without a jury."
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline "he right to appeal any arbitration award to the district court
Co., 254 F.3d 925, 930 within thirty days "on the grounds that the award is not supported
(10th Cir. 2001). by the evidence."
Gateway Techs., Inc. v.
MCI Telecomms. Corp., "[A]rbitration decision shall be final and binding on both parties,
64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. except that errors of law shall be subject to appeal."
1995).
Bargenquast v. Nakano "The arbitrator... shall have no power, in rendering the award,
Food, Inc., 243 F. Supp. to alter or depart from any express provision of this Agreement
2d 772, 774 (N.D. IL. or to make a decision which is not supported by law and
2002). substantial evidence."
Roadway Package System, Agreement "shall be governed by and construed in accordance
Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."
287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001).
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